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Chapters: John Cawte Beaglehole, Charles Chauvel, Shayle R. Searle, John Money, Michael Laws, Bill English, Howard Broad, Gordon Copeland, Charles R. Pellegrino, Sam Neill, Alan Macdiarmid, Jonathan Sarfati, Paul Reeves, John Dunmore, Jack Marshall, Sydney Walter Josland, David Mcniven Garner, Fred Hollows, Geoffrey Palmer, Marilyn Waring, Trevor Mallard, Chris Kraus, Roderick Deane, Bill Sutch, Robin Cooke, Baron Cooke of Thorndon, Derek Freeman, John Stuart Yeates, George Gair, Jack Yan, Rex Mason, Brian Talboys, Paul Mchugh, Steve Outtrim, Diamond Jenness, Witi Ihimaera, Fleur Adcock, Bill Barnard, Simon O'neill, Michael Fay, Maryan Street, Stephen Franks, Michael King, Joan Druett, Martin Banwell, Chris Finlayson, Simon Power, David Dickens, Charles E. M. Pearce, Fran Walsh, Doug Kidd, Niel Wright, Robin Maconie, Sue Kedgley, Michael Hardie Boys, Wyatt Creech, Ron Crocombe, Peter Cozens, Mark Prebble, John Belgrave, Roger Sowry, Don Hunn, Gareth Farr, John Blincoe, George Laking, Ross Mountain, Albert Wendt, Thomas Eichelbaum, John Campbell, Gareth Hughes, Georgina Te Heuheu, Michael Jackson, Richard Wild, Moana Mackey, Paul Morris, Kennedy Graham, Tony Backhouse, Chris Spence, Darren Hughes, Michael Wintringham, Tom Marshall, Chester Borrows, Jenny Mcleod, David Vernon Williams, Harry Bedford, Eleanor Catton, Conrad Smith, Anne Kennedy, Tim Groser, Arthur Everard, Raybon Kan, Michelle Ang, John Platts-Mills, Peter Bland, Derek Handley, Luamanuvao Winnie Laban, Frank Corner, Chong Kah Kiat, James William Brodie, Alister Mcintosh, Gillian Whitehead, Brian Easton, Guy Powles, Katherine Dienes, Rosie Scott, Jack Hunn, Dai Henwood, John Feeney, Richard Dell, Warren Carter, Peter Land, Maarten Wevers, Ron Jarden, Lloyd Jones, Thomas Gault, Devanesh Sharma, Lewis Holden, David Bennett, Kerry Prendergast, Jane Wrightson, Humphrey O'leary, Ian Mckinnon, Paul Gifford, Damien Wilkins, Ganesh Nana, Carl Berendsen, Kyriacos Trianta...More: http://booksllc.net/?id=2538433 ... Read more

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Purchase includes free access to book updates online and a free trial membership in the publisher's book club where you can select from more than a million books without charge. Chapters: Max Weber, Robert Nozick, Jürgen Habermas, Thomas Bayes, John Searle, Jesús Mosterín, Jon Elster, Oskar Morgenstern, R. Duncan Luce, Albrecht Wellmer. Excerpt:Albrecht Wellmer Albrecht Wellmer (July 9, 1933 - ) is a prominent German philosopher at the Freie Universität Berlin . Biography He studied maths and physics at Berlin and Kiel, then philosophy and sociology at Heidelberg and Frankfurt. He was an assistant to Jürgen Habermas at the University of Frankfurt from 1966 to 1970. He has held Professorships at the Universität Konstanz , the New School for Social Research and at the Freie Universität Berlin . He has held guest Professorships at Haverford, Stony Brooke, Collège International de Philosophie, the New School of Social Research and the Universiteit van Amsterdam. In 2006 he received the Theodor W. Adorno Award , a prestigious award for achievement in philosophy, theatre, music, and film. Works His works include books and articles about Aesthetics , Critical Theory , Ethics , Modernity , and Postmodernity and as well as thinkers such as Adorno , Habermas , Rorty , and Wittgenstein . Websites (URLs online) A hyperlinked version of this chapter is at Jesús Mosterín in October 2008 Jesús Mosterín (1941) is a leading Spanish philosopher and a thinker of broad spectrum, often at the frontier between science and philosophy. Biography Jesús Mosterin was born in Bilbao in 1941. He studied in Spain, Germany and the USA. Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Barcelona since 1983, he founded there an active Department of Logic, Philosophy and History of Science. Since 1996, he has been Research Professor at the National Research Council of Spain (CSIC). He is a fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh and a member of several inter... ... Read more

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Les achats comprennent une adhésion à l'essai gratuite au club de livres de l'éditeur, dans lequel vous pouvez choisir parmi plus d'un million d'ouvrages, sans frais. Le livre consiste d'articles Wikipedia sur : Hilary Putnam, John Mcdowell, G. E. M. Anscombe, John Searle, Pascal Engel, Donald Davidson, Jules Lagneau, David M. Armstrong, David Lewis, Jerry Fodor, Harry Frankfurt, Daniel Dennett, Jules Lachelier, David Chalmers, Ruth Millikan, Jaegwon Kim, Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, Gareth Evans, Fred Dretske. Non illustré. Mises à jour gratuites en ligne. Extrait : Hilary Whitehall Putnam (né le 31 juillet 1926, à Chicago, Illinois), est un philosophe américain. Il est une figure centrale de la philosophie occidentale depuis les années 1960, et ce particulièrement en philosophie de l'esprit, en philosophie du langage et en philosophie des sciences. Il est connu pour appliquer le même degré de vigilance à l'égard de ses propres positions philosophiques qu'à l'égard de celles des autres, soumettant chacune d'entre elles à une analyse rigoureuse jusqu'à en exposer les insuffisances. Ce faisant, il a acquis la réputation de changer fréquemment de position. Son œuvre se déploie sur une part importante du champ philosophique : philosophie des sciences, de la logique et des mathématiques ; Philosophie de l'esprit, du langage, et de la connaissance ; métaphilosophie, éthique et politique. En philosophie de l'esprit, Putnam est surtout connu pour avoir présenté un argument redoutable contre la thèse d'identité entre les états mentaux et les états cérébraux, argument fondé sur l'hypothèse de la réalisibilité multiple des propriétés du mental, et pour sa défense du fonctionnalisme, une théorie influente relativement au problème du corps et de l'esprit. En philosophie du langage, avec Saul Kripke notamment, il a développé la théorie causale de la référence et a proposé une approche originale de la signification, nommée external...http://booksllc.net/?l=fr ... Read more

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Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality -- these are themain topics in the work of John R. Searle, one of the leadingphilosophical figures of the present times. How language is based onintentionality, how intentionality in turn is to be explicated bymeans of distinctions discovered in Speech Act Theory, and howlanguage and intentionality are both related to social facts andinstitutions -- these are questions to be tackled in thisvolume. The contributions result from discussions on and with John R.Searle, containing Searle's own latest views -- including hisseminal ideas on Rationality in Action. The collection provides a goodbasis for advanced seminar debates in Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Mind, and Social Philosophy, and will also stimulatesome further research on all of the three main topics. ... Read more

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This digital document is an article from Encyclopedia of Philosophy, brought to you by Gale®, a part of Cengage Learning, a world leader in e-research and educational publishing for libraries, schools and businesses.The length of the article is 1133 words.The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase.You can view it with any web browser.Explores major marketing and advertising campaigns from 1999-2006. Entries profile recent print, radio, television, billboard and Internet campaigns. Each essay discusses the historical context of the campaign, the target market, the competition, marketing strategy, and the outcome. ... Read more

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Purchase includes free access to book updates online and a free trial membership in the publisher's book club where you can select from more than a million books without charge. Chapters: Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Ray Jackendoff, Jon Elster, Stephen Stich, John Perry, Zenon Pylyshyn, Elizabeth Spelke, Gilbert Harman, Jean Nicod Prize, Kim Sterelny, Ruth Millikan, Michael Tomasello, Fred Dretske, Susan Carey, Hans Kamp. Excerpt:Daniel Clement Dennett Daniel Clement Dennett (born March 28, 1942) is an American philosopher whose research centers on the philosophy of mind , philosophy of science and philosophy of biology , particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science . He is currently the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and a University Professor at Tufts University . Dennett is a noted atheist and secularist as well as being a prominent advocate of the Brights movement . Early life and education Dennett spent part of his childhood in Lebanon , where, during World War II , his father was a covert counter-intelligence agent with the Office of Strategic Services posing as a cultural attaché to the American Embassy in Beirut . The young Dennett and family returned to Massachusetts in 1947 after his father died in an unexplained plane crash. His sister is the investigative journalist Charlotte Dennett. He attended Phillips Exeter Academy and spent one year at Wesleyan University before receiving his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V. Quine . In 1965, he received his D.Phil in philosophy from Hertford College, Oxford , where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle . Career in academia Daniel Dennett in 2008 Dennett is currently (April 2009) the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, University Professor, and Co-Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies (with ... ... Read more

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Chapters: Fellows of the Society of Experimental Psychologists, Jean Nicod Prize Laureates, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Daniel Kahneman, Martin Seligman, Jerry Fodor, Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Donald Davidson, Elizabeth Loftus, Robert Sternberg, David Premack, Ray Jackendoff, Jon Elster, Walter Mischel, George Armitage Miller, Stephen Stich, Claude Steele, Dominic W. Massaro, Anne Treisman, John Perry, Morton Ann Gernsbacher, Zenon Pylyshyn, James Mcgaugh, Elizabeth Spelke, Anthony Greenwald, Gilbert Harman, Stephen Grossberg, Keith Holyoak, John Robert Anderson, Robert A. Rescorla, Kim Sterelny, Elissa L. Newport, William Kaye Estes, Rochel Gelman, Michael Gazzaniga, Martha Farah, Endel Tulving, Ruth Millikan, Michael Posner, Michael Tomasello, R. Duncan Luce, Fred Dretske, John Gabrieli, George Sperling, Herbert H. Clark, Leslie Ungerleider, Nancy Kanwisher, Saul Sternberg, Brian Wandell, Linda B. Smith, Lila R. Gleitman, Carol Fowler, James Mcclelland, Henry L. Roediger Iii, Marlene Behrmann, Nelson Cowan, Helen Neville, Susan Carey, Nora Newcombe, Roberta Klatzky, Robert A. Bjork, Hans Kamp, Dedre Gentner, Lynn Nadel, Larry Squire, Gordon H. Bower, Henry Gleitman, Carolyn Rovee-Collier, Geoffrey Loftus, C. Randy Gallistel. Source: Wikipedia. Pages: 282. Not illustrated. Free updates online. Purchase includes a free trial membership in the publisher's book club where you can select from more than a million books without charge. Excerpt: Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He holds the position of State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. He is known for his provocative and sometimes polemical style of argumentation. Fodor argues that mental st...More: http://booksllc.net/?id=427994 ... Read more

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This is a formal and systematic study of the logical foundations of speech act theory. The study of speech acts has been a flourishing branch of the philosophy of language and linguistics over the last two decades, and John Searle has of course himself made some of the most notable contributions to that study in the sequence of books Speech Acts (1969), Expression and Meaning (1979) and Intentionality (1983). In collaboration with Daniel Vanderveken he now presents the first formalised logic of a general theory of speech acts, dealing with such things as the nature of an illocutionary force, the logical form of its components, and the conditions of success of elementary illocutionary acts. The central chapters present a systematic exposition of the axioms and general laws of illocutionary logic. ... Read more

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This contemporary reassessment of the Institutional Critique movement, launched in the late 1960s by artists including Michael Asher and Hans Haacke, grew out of a symposium held at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. It looks at Institutional Critique’s central aim, the exposure and ironization of the structures and logic of museums and art galleries, and recent developments that engage with and echo it. IC has been raised again by Andrea Fraser, Renée Green and Fred Wilson, among others, and has been vigorously reoriented in recent years to address issues such as globalization. Contributors include Alexander Alberro, Mike Kelley, Hans Haacke, Lauri Firstenberg, Andrea Fraser, Renee Green and others. ... Read more

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EARLY HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY & SPACE. Imagine holding history in your hands. Now you can. Digitally preserved and previously accessible only through libraries as Early English Books Online, this rare material is now available in single print editions. Thousands of books written between 1475 and 1700 can be delivered to your doorstep in individual volumes of high quality historical reproductions. Humankind has studied the skies for centuries, seeking to find our place in the universe. Some of the most important discoveries in the field of astronomy were made in these texts recorded by ancient stargazers, but almost as impactful were the perspectives of those who considered their discoveries to be heresy. Any independent astronomer will find this an invaluable collection of titles arguing the truth of the cosmic system.

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An ephemeris for nine yeeres, inclusive, from the yeere of our Lord God 1609. to the yeere 1617. By Iohn Searle, Master in Chyrurgerie.
Searle, John, master in chirurgery.
"Quires B-1st O pr[inted]. by Allde; the rest by Windet"--STC.
The ephemeris proper, signed 2 M-2C 2D6, has nine divisional titles, "An ephemeris. for the yeare of Grace. 1609 [-1617]"; register is continuous.
With a slip-cancel on 1N6r.
[8], 23, 28-45, [23], 45-110, 127-184, 187-198, [252] p.
London : Printed by Iohn Windet [and Elizabeth Allde], for William Cotten and Iohn Tapp, 1609.
STC (2nd ed.) / 22142
English
Reproduction of the original in the Folger Shakespeare Library ... Read more

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Some argue meanings to be abstract logical objects but some philosophers, including Plato[citation needed], Augustine, Peter Abelard, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, John Searle, Jacques Derrida, and W.V. Quine, have offered alternative views. The nature of meaning, its definition, elements, and types, was discussed by Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas (also known as the AAA framework). According to them 'meaning is a relationship between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they mean (intend, express or signify)'.[citation needed] One term in the relation of meaning necessarily causes something else to come to the mind in consequence. In other words: 'a sign is defined as an entity that indicates another entity to some agent for some purpose'. The types of meanings vary according to the types of the thing that is being represented. ... Read more

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InNeuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker'sPhilosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.

Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.

In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging,Neuroscience and Philosophy is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

Customer Reviews (3)

Not long enough!
What happens when you put a neuroscientist, a Wittgenstein scholar, a self-described teleofuctionalist and a qualiaphile in the same ring? Well, for one thing, there's barely enough space for neutral corners but the arguments, rebuttals and discourse among these four erudite persons couldn't be more entertaining. Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, arguing for the existence of a human consciousness residing in the whole person, are taken on by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, who argue that the locus and milieu of consciousness lies solely in the brain. With an introduction and arguably biased conclusion by Daniel Robinson, this concise but informative book must be admired for its detail and descriptive character. Debates between weak and strong emergence abound: are we reducible to our component parts, or is there a complex confluence at work that produces consciousness? What causes it all: firing neurons and chemical combinations, or a mysterious alliance of constituent parts, brain/mind/body/environment? Are qualia simply qualities of objects or interpersonal properties of phenomenological experience?

All this and more, it's confrontational, it's accessible and it's neuroscience, cognition, philosophy, psychology, and linguistics all rolled together for the sake of consideration and understanding. This book, more than anything, serves as the impetus to further explore themes in neuroscience and consciousness. All four contributors offer their own insights in a wide range of independent publications.

Not impartial enough
Granted, Bennett and Hacker were the impetus behind this book's creation, but I feel they could have allowed more back-and-forth with Dennett and Searle, their two primary interlocutors.Instead, they republish sections of their own original arguments to give some context to Dennett and Searles' responses, which don't differ except in tone from their positions at the conference from which the book came.Then the book grants Bennett and Hacker another answer (composed, so far as I could tell, of almost willful misreadings of Searle's and Dennetts' criticisms), then a conclusion from a "referee" who, naturally, mostly judges them to have come out ahead in the argument.I expected more interlocution, but instead it seems to be a vehicle for Hacker and Bennett's position.

Conceptual confusions
That philosophy should unravel conceptual confusions in neuroscience or other sciences is a principal theme of the authors of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which book is in the presently reviewed one discussed by those authors, Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, and defended by them in response to criticisms by Daniel Dennett and John Searle.

However, major conceptual confusion characterizes the arguments of authors Bennett and Hacker themselves.

Let me begin by noting that all of these authors appear to subscribe to physicalism, describable as holding that all reality is reducible to physical phenomena. Consequently it is understandable that they will aim to fit their arguments into that straightjacket. A well-known expression of this attitude is the intense opposition to Cartesian dualism, the view by Descartes that mind and body, or mind and matter, are two distinct substances.

How derided this view is by the authors can be seen from the manner in which they speak of it: "crippling Cartesianism" (p.75, Dennett), "find themselves in bed with Descartes" (p.100, Searle), "the long, dark shadow of Descartes" (p.159, Bennett and Hacker). Only the commentator in the book, Daniel Robinson, expresses (pp.192-3) reservations about "how many kinds of different sorts of 'stuff' might be constitutive of all reality", but he considers such questions "best to leave unanswered".

They need not be left unanswered in philosophy, which with the aid of logic is here to try to resolve them. I may immodestly note that I deal with such questions in my On Proof for Existence of God, and Other Reflective Inquiries, but now I wish to point out confusions by the principal reviewed authors, whose object is to prevent confusion.

In their arguments they contend (p.208, note 6) that "the idea that the mind is a SUBSTANCE [I capitalized italics] of any kind is not coherent", i.e. that it makes no "sense" to speak of mind as contrasted with the body. But the authors are confused by words. "Substance" is usually defined by the likes of "essential nature", and the main issue, regardless of words used, is whether there is an entity customarily termed "mind" which is distinct from the body. The entity in question is obviously, in Descartes' and other discussions of interaction between mind and body, consciousness--leaving aside particulars like recent propounding of an unconscious. And it certainly makes sense to inquire about the relation between conscious and bodily occurrences.

But the most prominent area of confusion by the authors is in their primary contention of a "mereological fallacy" (e.g. p.22), regarding "the logic of part/whole relations". The authors repeatedly contend such as: "psychological predicates are ascribable to the whole animal, not to its constituent parts". The underlying dispute is with neuroscientists who ascribe "psychological predicates" to the brain, and the presently discussed authors insist: "Human beings, but not their brains, can be said to be thoughtful or to be thoughtless; animals, but not their brains..., can be said to see, hear, smell and taste things..." And the authors repeat: "psychological predicates apply paradigmatically to the HUMAN BEING (OR ANIMAL) AS A WHOLE, and NOT to the body or its parts".

It should be noted that the shift to the brain by neuroscientists is done from the traditional "mind" or consciousness, since the latter does not lend itself to their physical scrutiny. And the turn by the discussed authors to the "whole" of the animal is evidently born of the like physicalist presupposition that one cannot speak of a mind separate from the body. Ironically, their phrase "psychological predicates" itself relies on the word "psyche" for "soul", and it is easy to see that their arguments correspondingly confuse the concepts involved.

It is not the "whole" of the human or animal that thinks, sees, hears, smells and tastes things. The arm does not take part in thinking, or the leg in seeing. It is indeed a truism that it is the conscious part in us that performs those tasks, enlisting in cases some of the body. Try as they may, thinkers cannot dismiss the role of consciousness in our lives.
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Publisher: New York, The Chemical Catalog Company, inc.Publication date: 1929Subjects: Potash industry and tradeBoraxPhase rule and equilibriumNotes: This is an OCR reprint. There may be numerous typos or missing text. There are no illustrations or indexes.When you buy the General Books edition of this book you get free trial access to Million-Books.com where you can select from more than a million books for free. You can also preview the book there. ... Read more