Product Description
This is the first English translation of one of Heidegger's most important early lecture courses, including his most extensive treatment of the topic of destruction. "Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression" is a crucial text for understanding the early development of Heidegger's thought. This lecture course was presented in the summer semester of 1920 at the University of Freiburg. At the center of this course is Heidegger's elaboration of the meaning and function of the phenomenological destruction. In no other work by Heidegger do we find as comprehensive a treatment of the theme of destruction as in this lecture course. Culminating in a destruction of contemporaneous philosophy in terms of its understanding of 'life' as a primal phenomenon, this lecture course can be seen to open the way towards a renewal of the meaning of philosophy as such. This hugely important philosophical work is now available in English for the first time. ... Read more

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Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics" is one of the most important works written by this figure of 20th-century philosophy. The new translation aims to make this work more accessible including provision of conventional translations of Greek passages that Heidegger translated unconventionally. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (12)

Difficult but...
Let's get the obvious out of the way first. Heidegger's writing can be very difficult and is often torturous. Add to that Heidegger's obvious and overt German nationalism and you've got a challenging book on more than one level.

First, Heidegger is engaged in this text in a radical deconstruction of all the traditional ontological categories of Western philosophy as they have existed and been defined for the past two-thousand years, beginning with the most basic concept of all "Being". Because of this Heidegger is completely unable to rely on accepted and traditional categories of thought, and their traditional definitions, in expressing his own thought, and instead has recourse to neologisms such as "the abiding-emerging sway" which defy precise, scientific definition, relying instead on a certain suggestiveness in order to convey their meaning. This makes Heidegger's writing difficult to understand from a technical standpoint especially for those who are used to a certain scientific precision of definition in their concepts, which Heidegger's guiding thoughts definitely lack. And that is not a mere accident that can be easily rectified through a more precise definition of terms but is deeply rooted in Heidegger's philosophy and his notions of being and language.

Secondly, Heidegger's work is a challenge because, with the benefit of hindsight, we know precisely where Heidegger's celebration of the German spirit and it's supposed role in a total spiritual rejuvenation of the West, leads. It is almost impossible, therefore, to read certain passages from Heidegger where his German nationalism is most prominently on display without a definite feeling of revulsion. This makes it difficult to separate Heidegger's more general philosophical point about the spiritual decline of the West and the forgetting of the question of Being, which in my opinion is not necessarily allied to German nationalism or any other form of nationalism, from Heidegger's own nationalism, and so it is easy to dismiss them both as part of the same bag. In other words, it is easy to dismiss Heidegger's philosophical points based on his questionable political allegiances precisely because the two seem allied for Heidegger himself and because Heidegger often expresses his more general philosophical points in nationalistic dress. Heidegger presents his notion of the forgetting of Being, for instance, in the form of a battle between the spiritual integrity of the German people and the spiritlessness of American capitalism and rationalism on one hand and Soviet Marxism on the other. But in my opinion it is both possible and worthwhile to separate Heidegger's basic insights from these nationalistic tendencies though to do so means pushing past our initial revulsion to try to get to the basic point Heidegger is trying to make, which can be difficult to do.

Despite it's difficulties this is a very important book and well worth the many frustrations that will inevitably accompany anyone in their efforts to unravel it's meaning. Few books have frustrated me more than this one does in places. I found myself at times wanting to yell, "For God's sake Heidegger, can't you at least try to be clear, and say precisely what you mean! Spit it out! Get to the point" I will also admit that I am still a long ways away from fully unraveling the meaning and implications of this book or of Heidegger's thought in general. That being said, I still consider this book to be extremely important and as revolutionary today as it was when it was written.

It would be impossible to summarize this book, or why I think it is important, since the thoughts contained in this book could lead in a nearly infinite number of directions, and to fully explain why I think this book is such an exciting work I would have to try to follow all of them, or as many of them as I can think of, which would take up most of the rest of my life. The best I can do is point to one aspect of this book that I think is especially interesting and important, and which explains why I believe this work should be read by anyone with an interest in philosophy whether they ultimately agree with Heidegger's standpoint or not.

In this work Heidegger attempts to trace the origin of the distinction in Western ontology between being and thinking. In doing so Heidegger attempts to overcome the subject-object dichotomy which has dominated Western metaphysics since it's inception. To do so Heidegger attempts to retrieve a more originary understanding of being and thinking, and of both as fundamentally allied with appearing, which he traces to the earliest Greek philosophers. Heidegger's interpretations of Greek philosophy, as well as his interpretations of the Greek poets, are highly controversial. But whether or not Heidegger's interpretations of the early Greek thinkers are "correct" or not makes no difference in terms of the revolutionary character of Heidegger's own thought. Whether his ontology is based in a more original beginning of philosophy that has been forgotten, or is merely his own invention, it is still revolutionary in it's implications. Few philosophers, with the possible exception of Merleau-Ponty who I have only begun to study and cannot offer any final opinions on, have offered such a clear and philosophically sophisticated alternative to traditional Western ontologies based on the subject-object divide as Heidegger does in his reinterpretation of Being as physis. For that reason alone Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics merits close attention from anyone professing to be a philosopher...

(Also, for those looking for a little help in their interpretation of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics I would highly suggest Richard Polt and Gregory Fried's companion volume to Heidegger's book. I have actually only read the first few essays but they have been very helpful)

-Brian

Why you should read this book
I am not a philosopher or a philosophy student but enjoyed reading this book because:
1. It shows cases some pretty original thinking.
2. The question "why there are beings and nothing at all " is eternal although in today's world many people think there is only the theory of evolution and other "zoological" explanations to this question.Heidegger shows how this question can be posed in way that shows "what" it means to be even if we we know "how"(i.e. evolution, natural selection etc.) we came to be.
3. The whole book is really about clarifying the question and trying to unbundle all the preconceptions about the question.Only towards the end we get a glimmer about what could be the start of an answer.
4. Heidegger is an eloquent writer and this must in large measure must be due to the translator's competence.
5.Yes, there are many reference to Greek words and poems and one does have to read many sections twice but the scope of the book is sweeping so the rewards of a second or third read are well worth it.
6.At the least you will question the familiarity of many words and their everday usage after you read the book and that should hopefully help you think more clearly and equally (if not more importantly, after reading Heidegger..)articulate yourself clearly.

Translation of a modern classic in philosophy
The single question is the subject that starts this lecture:
" Why are there essents rather than nothing?" In California English that is:
" Why is there something instead of nothing?".
Such a simple questions , it has four basic referents:
1) something ( existence, physics)
2) nothing ( lack of existence, null set)
3) Why ( motivation or external reference: what makes it metaphysics)
4) Finally the person asking "why", the observer; the human element.
He spends a lot of time ranting about what it all means:
he is a philosopher:
that is what they do( maybe not best, but well).
I can't give him a five star, because quantum mechanics was already well
underway in Germany at the time and he doesn't mention Heisenberg.
Actually it might have helped his reasoning to have made this connection.
We have traveled on in human timeand a lot of people since have made the quantum mechanics connection
of observer and the something being observed
being changed by the observation.
Externals to the universe besides "nothing" and the "not observer" of the "Why" ( sometimes thought of as God or the creator?) and
we have cosmological theories
of other universes external to our own and physics being influenced by matter outside of the "something" that we can observe.
The meta-universe of metaphysics has expanded, so that God ( not observer external to something) now shares his domain with bubbling universes.
The information theory problem of Hawking and black holes
and ideas of what happened before the big bang brought up here.
The concept of something external to the something we can observe
that isn't also nothing or the "not observer" makes five total sectors to the new metaphysics and not the existential four.

those elusive basic definitions
Why is there something rather than nothing? That is the question Heidegger challenges us with at the beginning of this book. Those who were expecting an answer must remain unsatisfied, for the author uses that question as a starting point to show that language, as presently used, doesn't supply us with the linguistic tools we need to even formulate a precise approach to the problem. Heidegger tells us that before we can properly consider that primary question we must come to an understanding of what we mean by being. The rest of the book is the attempt to approach the elusive meaning of this term. Heidegger's arguments are surprisingly less abstract than I had expected. Evidently an intense student of language, he shows how much of the confusion about the term "being" has come about through a debasing of the originally purer, more vivid Greek roots. To Heidegger, archaic Greek language was akin to poetry. Indeed, he argues that poetry is the most direct way to draw near to the meaning of being. I was particularly impressed, even somewhat awed, by his analysis of the poem of the chorus in Sophocles' "Antigone". This poem tells us of Man, the strangest being, and pulls back the veil of familiarity through which we perceive existence. I felt intrigued as I was swept along with his insights, but must admit that, for me, it would take an intense study involving a rereading, along with help from books with titles such as "Understanding Heidegger's philosophy" or the like, to feel I was truly absorbing his meanings. Nevertheless, I feel it was worthwhile to explore this book, for having gotten at least a basic familiarization with this modern philosopher, and gaining a foundation to build on should I desire to pursue the subject further.

How can we know?Heidegger's argument. . . .
Martin Heidegger is a difficult philosopher to read. His own biography, serving as at least a passive supporter of Nazi Germany, makes him somewhat suspect.His opaque and challenging writing style can easily turn one off.However, whether or not one agrees with his ideas, this work is important to confront.He raises arguments that confront many of our beliefs about the way that things are.The struggle to understand--and critique--his views is well worthwhile.

According to Heidegger, the word "phenomenon" comes from the Greek term "to show itself."A phenomenon, then, is that which shows itself, that which is manifest.An appearance is not necessarily the thing itself, since appearances are merely referential to the underlying thing.For instance, a disease is the phenomenon itself, but we normally only recognize it through its appearance, that is, its symptoms.To know things, then, we must get beyond mere appearance.To do this, we must, in part, suspend our illusions that we truly "know" the thing (or "essent," as it is referred to in "An Introduction to Metaphysics" [trans. Ralph Manheim]).

The opposite of a phenomenon is "covered-upness."This is when the essence of a phenomenon is hidden from us.This can come about in three ways: (1) it is as yet undiscovered; (2) it can be buried over or forgotten--it was once discovered but has since deteriorated, either by losing sight of the thing or by forgetting it; (3) it can be disguised (this is the most frequent and the most dangerous route).The third possibility can come about through deception or misleading.

We must beware of reifying concepts, treating them without questioning, without trying to get at their essence.Heidegger says:

"Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there isthe possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion.It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis.Even in the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lurks the possibility that what has been primordially 'within our grasp' may become hardened so that we can no longer grasp it.And the difficulty of this kind of research lies in making it self-critical in a positive sense."

Again, we must not reify phenomena and lose sight of their primordial character.We must continue to question what we observe and not "take it for granted."He emphasizes in another work that we must ". . .push our questioning to the very end." He contends that, simplistically put, we should "challenge everything" or "question everything."We must not ". . .be led astray by overhasty theories, but to experience things as they are on the basis of the first thing that comes to mind."

He concludes by noting that "The true problem is what we do not know and what, insofar as we know it authentically, namely as a problem, we know only questioningly."That is, we are closest to knowing the essence of something when we recognize that that sense of knowledge is itself a problem, that is, that we cannot be sure that we really know it.If we come to think that we know something, we tend to do so theoretically and, in the process, distance ourself from the thing itself and its being.

Key points at which these thoughts challenge the dominant liberal tradition of which Americans are a part: skepticism about the power of human reason or logic to uncover what is and apprehend what should be (contra the ability of humans to divine natural law through the exercise of reason), avoidance of reifying concepts and theories (those in the liberal tradition, once more, believe that we can uncover the essence of reality and develop theories to explain what is), question those ideas that one develops and continue questioning one's understanding of what is.Finally, the subject and object are linked with one another; we cannot step back and understand objectively that which is around us, as Enlightenment thinkers believe.

At least for me, this was a tough read.But, in the end, it raises questions that are worth addressing, whether or not one has any level of agreement with Heidegger.

... Read more

Product Description

In Four Seminars, Heidegger reviews the entire trajectory of his thought and offers unique perspectives on fundamental aspects of his work. First published in French in 1976, these seminars were translated into German with Heidegger's approval and reissued in 1986 as part of his Gesamtausgabe, volume 15. Topics considered include the Greek understanding of presence, the ontological difference, the notion of system in German Idealism, the power of naming, the problem of technology, danger, and enowning. Heidegger's engagements with his philosophical forebears -- Parmenides, Heraclitus, Kant, and Hegel -- continue in surprising dialogues with his contemporaries -- Husserl, Marx, and Wittgenstein. While providing important insights into how Heidegger conducted his lectures, these seminars show him in his maturity reflecting back on his philosophical path. An important text for understanding contemporary philosophical debates, Four Seminars provides extraordinarily rich material for students and scholars of Heidegger.

Customer Reviews (1)

Mainly on philosophical topics, certainly dense
FOUR SEMINARS seems rather fragmentary to me.The text was created by a few people who got together on a number of occasions.Things that are numbered have a lot of firsts on a single page, particularly on page 47, where the topology of being is imagined with three aspects:

Three terms which succeed one another and at the same time indicate three steps along the way of thinking:MEANING -- TRUTH -- PLACE . . .
First, truth. . . .
First, what does "meaning" signify?Meaning in BEING AND TIME is defined in terms of a project region, and projection is the accomplishment of Dasein, which means the ek-static instancy in the openness of being.By ek-sisting, Dasein includes meaning.The thinking that proceeds from BEING AND TIME, in that it gives up the word "meaning of being" in favor of "truth of being," henceforth emphasizes the openness of being itself, rather than the openness of Dasein in regard to this openness of being.
This signifies "the turn," in which thinking always more decisively turns to being as being.

The statements above are taken from 23 lines of text.I have omitted a Greek word for place and a German word for instancy.The ek- form of words pops up so frequently that I noticed a Greek instance on page 54:

What for Aristotle was a development [Auseinanderfolge] (the result of an emerging out of; ek-eis), becomes a succession [Aufeinanderfolge] (through the determination of the result as sequential) -- this due to the fact that the first idea is only an "occult quality," brought into disrepute by the Cartesians, though nevertheless rehabilitated in a certain sense by Leibniz.

This book does not have an index or translation of most Greek terms, but glossaries (pp. 113-118) of German-English and English-German correspondence allow those who are sure of a meaning in one language to check for which word this corresponds to in the other translation.The seminars in 1966, 1968, 1969, and 1973 took place in French, and the German translator, Curd Ochwadt, provides an Afterword with a poem by Martin Heidegger in German which is translated in a note on page 112.There is also an Afterword which appeared in COLLECTED EDITION, VOLUME 15 on Heidegger quoting Hegel's "A torn sock is better than a mended one" (p. 98).If this book did have an index, I'm sure it should contain:

Parmenides, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Marx, Pindar, and Descartes for pages 1-9.

Hegel, Holderlin, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Aristotle, Descartes, Luther, Galileo, William of Ockham, Husserl, Jean Beaufret, Kant, Heraclitus, Newton, Plato, Marx, Kant, Freud and Meister Eckhart for pages 10-34.

I spent a lot of time contemplating page 32, which contains such gems as:

This lived-body is something like the reach of the human body (last night, the moon was closer than the Louvre).
What "seeing" here means is in question, if one admits, despite a well-established French tradition, that cows never see trains pass by.
When Marx says, "Man produces himself, etc. . . . ," it means:"Man is a factory.Man produces himself as he produces his shoes."But what does "Production" mean for Hegel?By no means that man produces the Absolute.Production is the figure of reflection's accomplishment.

Truly complicated matters on September 6, 1969, include a list of seven questions by Roger Munier concerning technology that had been raised on September 11, 1966, a mere 35 years before a famous catastrophe in New York and at the Pentagon.Fifth question:"Will the rapid spreading of technological things not finally bring about an essential poverty, from which a turning around of the human to the truth of its essence becomes possible, even if by a detour of errancy?"(p. 45).Who knew? ... Read more

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Anselm Kiefer and the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger is a work of cultural history that situates the art works of one of the most important contemporarypainters in relation to the existential, phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy of Heidegger. Analyzing the development of Kiefer's art in terms of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, history, and technology, Matthew Biro demonstrates that the artist's subjects reflect and transform the philosopher's theoretical interests and intellectual development. The works of Kiefer and Heidegger, Biro argues, present a constellation of issues that unite German art and theory for most of the twentieth century. Showing the aesthetic relevance of the three stages of Heidegger's philosophical thought to Kiefer's work, this book also demonstrates the impact of Kiefer's art works on contemporary art and theory. ... Read more

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"... an excellent translation of an extremely important book." -- The Modern Schoolman

This early version of Being and Time (1927) offers a unique glimpse into the motivations that prompted the writing of this great philosopher's master work and the presuppositions that gave shape to it. Theodore Kisiel's outstanding translation permits English readers to appreciate the central importance of this text for the development of Heidegger's thought.

Customer Reviews (4)

Excellent Preparation for Being and Time
`Heidegger's History of the Concept of Time', translated by Kisiel, is a compilation of Heidegger's lecture notes from a 1925 course taught at the University of Marburg.These lectures cover much of the same ground articulated in `Being and Time' (1927), and can be read as an draft of Heidegger's magnum opus.

Often one of the greatest challenges that students face in reading historic thinkers is the question of context.That is, what is the intellectual milieu that the writer is working within, and, what question(s) are they seeking to address?Getting a feel for these considerations can be particularly difficult with an abstruse writer such as Heidegger.As such, these lecture notes are invaluable in situating the reader and providing valuable context.

Kisiel's translation of `History of the Concept of Time' is clear and accessible possessing a smoothness that is absent in some English translations of Heidegger.John Drabinski's `Between Husserl and Heidegger'(available on-line course), is an excellent companion to when reading this text - it discusses History of the Concept of Time in addition to other works by Husserl and Heidegger.Drabinski is a capable commentator and his pedagogical approach of working from within Heidegger's language, while challenging for the novice, is an ultimately rewarding approach.

Overall, `The History of the Concept of Time' is an excellent addition to the corpus of Heideggerian work available in English.I highly recommended it for all students of Heidegger, particularly those approaching Being and Time for first time.

Considered the best exposition of phenomenology
Anyone coming from a rational empiricist background need not be offended by Heidegger's thinking since he does manage to look at matters from a radically different perspective that is novel and worthy of consideration.In this way, he expands our own thinking and puts into critical relief our own position.This is considered by scholars to be the best exposition of phenomenology.The fact Heidegger is able to explain other thinkers and other philosophers in such a superb manner seems to indicate how thoroughly he thought through to get to his own position.Paul Edwards cursory dismissal of Heidegger, although a worthy cause in itself, doesn't do justice to Heidegger.

Extremely helpful
As a student with a great deal of interest in Heidegger's ontologicalinquiry, I found this to be an indispensable supplement to Being and Time. Where Being and Time seems unbearably difficult to understand, History ofthe Concept of Time offers clarification.Since it is a collection oflecture/notes, the writing is usually more straight-forward, which as weknow is a blessing when it comes to Heidegger.I would recommend readingBeing and Time and History of the Concept of Time in tandem.

An early draft of `Being and Time'.
Perhaps, one of the first and least interesting of Heidegger's long phenomenology books from the 1920s. Most of what is contained within this text is worked out brilliantly in his masterwork `Being and Time, e.g., theontological/ontic structures of temporality.Ironically, there is littleexposition of `history' or the history of the `concept of time' in thiswork.I read this work during my thesis on Heidegger's thinking onspatiality.It contains some insights regarding this aspect of Heidegger'sthought, but does not add much to `Being and Time.'I recommend this toserious and budding Heidegger scholars, but others with only a passinginterest I would recommend `Being and Time' and `The Basic Problems OfPhenomenology' as much better choices. ... Read more

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"In Albert Hofstadter's excellent translation, we can listen in as Heidegger clearly and patiently explains... the ontological difference." -- Hubert L. Dreyfus, Times Literary Supplement

Customer Reviews (5)

A flood of philosophical brilliance, though "Being and Time" is an imperative prerequisite
I concur with Mr. Belcher's warning. This book will be impenetrable without prior knowledge of Heidegger and especially Being and Time. The reason for this is that "BP" is primarily preoccupied with the "temporal" facet of Heidegger's quest to carve out a path for fundamental-ontology. What this does is explicitly presupposed the reader with the investigations of "Being and Time". In this book, the insights of those investigations are explicitly applied to particular stages in the history of ontology, culminating in what is nothing less than a stunning vivisection of Kant.

Since Mr. Belcher has written such an economical and informative review, I'd like to just build upon his remarks. The "ontological difference" does indeed consist of "entities vs the Being of entities" as translated. However, I think that this English translation by Hofstadter, one that is perhaps initiated by Macquarrie & Robinson [I'm not sure], slightly undermines Heidegger's teachings. After all Macquarrie was a theologian who thought that God was latent in "Being and Time", hence the capitalization and consequential mystification of "Being". One also wonders about the extent to which the presuppositions of his field influenced his translation of "Being and Time". In relation to this, one of more daunting insights of this text is where Heidegger vividly shows the reader how all of medieval, modern, and even ancient ontology is in some way grounded in the being of God. In steps Nietzsche and his entire argument [which I think Heidegger took as his marching orders]. Anyway, this graphical enhancement of being into "Being" obscures Heidegger's investigations because no where in his thought is there an Oz. Of course, one could object that "being" is already an objectification. Those who would level this conjecture shouldn't worry because Heidegger lays down all the parameters for such a scenario in this very book.

There is also the problem of substituting "entities" for "beings". The problem with this is that in English "entity" is a throughly ontical designation that has no ontological connotation whatsoever. We hardly designate thoughts or impulses as "entities". As soon as we do such a thing they become objectified and cast off into the doomed subjective/objective split, which Heidegger illuminates in this book with astonishing clarity and rigor. "Entity" breaches Heidegger's drive to reveal how the ontical is "always already" existentially in the ontological. By substituting "beings" for "entities", so as to arrive at "the being of a being", being is less alien, both to us and to "the things themselves" [phenomena].

The frequency in which the term "horizon" appears in this text is only consequential to the elucidation of "Temporality" [estatical-enpresenting]. I think the crucial reason as to why "horizon" becomes increasingly important is because Heidegger's temporal enterprise is, at bottom, an interpretation of "care". Here we can again see why "Being and Time" is so important for this text, since "care" is an eminent facet of "Being and Time". In this case it would perhaps be circumspect to take Heidegger's "Temporality" [estatical-enpresenting] as an attempt to institute "care" itself as a limit-situation, with the "horizons" serving as the literal schematic boundaries which are then maintained by the temporal ecstasies, though this is only a preoccupation of mine. One could perhaps further inquire into how these schema [horizions-praesens] are made manifest, and thus constituted. To impart to you another one of my worthless positions, I was personally heeded from any such inquiry because throughout all the teachings of Heidegger that I've encountered, but especially here, I could hear Nietzsche's cry "back to the body".

Aside from the above, I can only add a warning; never hold Heidegger up to Derrida and Foucault in an attempt to understand him, or any other post-68 Parisians for that matter. If anything, the exact opposite should be done.

If you are looking for an introduction to Heidegger, then I think his "Introduction to Metaphysics" is a fine referral. However, there really isn't an aspect of Heidegger that lends itself to blithe curiosity, so be warned.

The great Philosophy.
I have studies about relationship between Immunology and Psychopathology including Heidegger. His philosophy is very similar to my fundamental philosophy. He is the great person who teached me the important medical philosophy.

eminently readable and interesting
This is an eminently readable translation of Heidegger--a chore that is indeed quite difficult. Moreover, the material Heidegger treats here finds a very concise, cohesive presentation, so it is all in all a very approachable text. As a reviewer noted below, this text is quite helpful in understanding _Being and Time_, or just generally for its own value in exposing Heidegger's thought around this time. Highly recommeded for someone serious about approaching texts by Heidegger.

Clean as a whistle, until it defines "is"
Mostly, philosophy is clean as a whistle, and we rarely understand it well enough to bow to the obviously superior form of intellect which, lecturing in 1927, strove to convince those who would like to consider themselves at the cutting edge of knowledge that:

"We have here once again the peculiar circumstance that the unveiling appropriation of the extant in its being-such is precisely not a subjectivizing but just the reverse, an appropriating of the uncovered determinations to the extant entity as it is itself."(p. 219).

If you read the small print on the cover of THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1982, published in German as Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie in 1975) by Martin Heidegger, you will see that this book includes "Translation, Introduction, and Lexicon by Albert Hofstadter."The Lexicon is quite an accomplishment:pages 339 to 396 contain a wealth of information about the pages on which particular words ended up in this translation of lectures by Heidegger on philosophical problems.If you read the book first, then come to the first entry on page 340, "already, always already, antecedent, before, beforehand, earlier, in advance, precedent, prior--expressions used with great frequency: . . ." you know that dozens of pages can be cited for "some characteristic instances: . . . "Longer entries provide more complete indexing for being, being-in-the-world, beings, Da, Dasein, exist, extant, horizon, interpretation, "is" (See copula), Kant, now, nows (nun), ontological, ontology, philosophy, problem, problems, problems, specific, projection, project, self, structure, subject, Temporal, Temporality, temporal, temporality (zeitlich . . .), temporalize (zeitigen), theses, thing, thingness, thinghood, thinking, time, transcend, truth, understand, understanding of being, unveil, and world.

Frankly, I am glad that I have previously attempted to read lectures and the Heraclitus seminars which used the Greek alphabet (alpha, beta, gamma, delta, etc.) for Greek words, so that I was warned that translation was necessary, and I learned enough Greek words to recognize that ancient language even when it is printed in transliterated form, with no indication that a foreign language is being used, as frequently occurs in this book.

"In a corresponding passage Aristotle says that this `is' means a synthesis and is accordingly en sumploke dianoias kai pathos en taute, it is the coupling that the intellect produces as combining intellect, and this `is' means something that does not occur among things; it means a being, but a being that is, as it were, a state of thought."(p. 182).

People with absolutely no knowledge of Greek might try reading the Lexicon entry for "Greek expressions" (pp. 358-359) before reading pages 73, 86, 115, etc. to remind themselves that when they read "to on" on page 53, they were reading Greek, as "to ti en einai" on page 85 is a bit more obviously not in English, as Aristotle was not.How helpful is this?Consider the final entry in Greek expressions:zoe, 121.Looking it up, I find in the final paragraph of section 12:

"First, however, one problem makes its claim on our attention:besides the extant (at-hand extantness) there are beings in the sense of the Dasein, who exists.But this being which we ourselves are--was this not always already known, in philosophy and even in pre-philosophical knowledge?Can one make such a fuss about stressing expressly the fact that besides the extant at-hand there is also this being that we ourselves are?After all, every Dasein, insofar as it is, always already knows about itself and knows that it differs from other beings.We ourselves said that for all its being oriented primarily to the extant at-hand, ancient ontology nevertheless is familiar with psuche, nous, logos, zoe, bios, soul, reason, life in the broadest sense.Of course.But it should be borne in mind that the ontical, factual familiarity of a being does not after all guarantee a suitable interpretation of its being."(pp. 120-121).

The actual lectures only consist of 22 sections, with "The Being of the Copula" in Chapter Four (pp. 177-224) primarily considered in sections 16 and 17, though the outline of the subject at the end of Heidegger's Introduction, section 6, suggested that this would be at the end of Part One, Chapter Four.Section 18 on the existential mode of being of truth has also been included at the end of Chapter Four, where it seems to follow quite naturally.Though it is only followed by Part Two, Chapter One, anyone who wishes to imagine more may adopt the idea stated by Heidegger on page 225 that Part Two would also have four chapters, in which we could encounter the basic problems again ending with "fourthly, the problem of the truth-character of being."

There isn't anything about pandering in the Lexicon, but the 22 listings for "copula" might be close, considering the "See `is' " cross-reference and the amount of political scandal that has recently been generated by President Clinton when he was trying to think non-copulatively in the way he defined "is."The 1908 Oxford translation of Aristotle included in note 4 on page 181 illustrates the kind of compartmentalization that most people exhibited in thinking about the impeachment proceedings:

"For neither are `to be' and `not to be' and the participle `being' significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled."

Continuation of Being and Time
This book is a must read for those that choose to read Being and Time.The book itself is based, like so many of Heidegger's books, off of a lecture course he gave at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927.This is important because Being and Time was ready for publication in 1927.If we put Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics alongside The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and Being and Time, we have the predominant whole of early Heideggerian thinking.

As for the book itself (for now on referred to as BP), the book is incomplete--just like Being and Time.Heidegger undertakes Three Parts each with Four chapters (see page 24).But BP only deals with all of Part One and only chapter 1 of Part Two.Heidegger gets no farther than the Problem of Ontological Difference (entities vs. the Being of entities) and the lecture course ends.But the book is extraordinarly helpful because of what it does address.Part One is elaborate and interesting because it deals with other philosophers and their ideas.Heidegger pays particular attention to Kant, Aristotle, Descartes and explains how their ideas have been inherited into the contemporary philosophic era.What I found most interesting was the deconstruction of Medieval and Modern ontology.Heidegger thus gives a broad historical interpretation of the history of philosophy and explains the presuppositions of each period.

Obviously this book is not for philosophical neophytes.The book should only be undertaken by those with some background in 20th century philosophy and knowledge of basic Heideggerian thought.The book's appeal should thus be limited to few individuals, and certainly only those with philosophic interest.

The book borrows much of the terminology from Being and Time with some notable exceptions.Authenticity and inauthenticity have pracitically been dropped.The term "horizon" becomes notably more important and the term "Temporality" is of great importance to understanding what is being disclosed from the text.Ontological difference is explicitly defined, though it was implicitly defined in Being and Time.Pay particular attention to Part Two of the work, for it questions through many of the underlying questions I had after completing Being and Time.If you are disappointed how the book abruptly ends, it is to be expected.But for those 285 people on Earth interested in Heidegger this book is indispensable.But read Being and Time first!

Philosophy Student,
Drake University ... Read more

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The Phenomenology of Religious Life presents the text of Heidegger's important 1920--21 lectures on religion. The volume consists of the famous lecture course Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, a course on Augustine and Neoplatonism, and notes for a course on The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism that was never delivered. Heidegger's engagements with Aristotle, St. Paul, Augustine, and Luther give readers a sense of what phenomenology would come to mean in the mature expression of his thought. Heidegger reveals an impressive display of theological knowledge, protecting Christian life experience from Greek philosophy and defending Paul against Nietzsche.

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This text explores Heidegger's influence on 20th century thought, illustrating his particular importance for deconstruction, existentialism and phenomenology, and his effect on all major strands of post-structuralist and postmodern philosophy. The book debates whether Heidegger was offering a deeply conservative mythology, or whether he was actually "deconstructing" philosophy as the West has known it. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (7)

Heidegger the Philosopher Coexists With Heidegger The Nazi
Before purchasing this book, I skimmed the sections on Heidegger's Nazi past. I wanted to make sure that the book confronted the subject directly.

It does. There is none of the evasiveness that characterizes, say, Hannah Arendt's essay "Heidegger at 80." Indeed, the author presents information on Heidegger's Nazism of which I was not aware. He correctly situates Heidegger's actions within the context of Heidegger's refusal to repudiate them after the war.

There are a few weird spots. Hannah Arendt shows up at the end simply as a critic of Heidegger. She was that for awhile, but for the last 25 years of her life she was his former mistress, dedicating herself to rehabilitating her (presumably by then) former sexual partner's reputation. The Heidegger/Arendt love letters have been in print since 1995, and the author really ought to have considered what we now know about the pair.

The author mentions Levinas as having been influenced by Heidegger. Levinas was indeed influenced by a man whose actions he later grew to despise. However, Levinas lambasted Heidegger and his work repeatedly for its amorality. Levinas was also unwilling, and rightly so, to forgive Heidegger's Nazi past. It was odd to see no mention of Levinas's attitude.

Finally, we now know that Heidegger's doctoral dissertation was flawed. Heidegger thought he was analyzing two works by Duns Scotus and integrating them. But in factone of the two books was by another medieval philosopher entirely. The book is unclear as to what the specific problem was.

Great Introduction - Read and be Pleased
While the comic-strip style of the "Introducing..." series can be entertaining and beneficial when it comes to breaking up the monotony of dense philosophy, it also tends to be rather distracting and can make the survey of Heidegger more difficult to understand.HOWEVER, I think this volume is well done!

As far as a survey of Heidegger's work goes, this is a very accessible introduction - truly living up to its name.You will be excited about his thought and itching to read "Being and Time" when you're through with this book.

Interested in the thought of Heidegger?Not ready to go to critical editions of his work just yet?Read this Introduction!!

Not a bad introduction, but lacking in some respects
While this is a decent introduction to one of the most notoriously difficult (yet influential) philosophers of the 20th century, as the title says, it is lacking in some respects.The biggest thing I noticed is that the author discusses Descartes and Husserl... but NEVER mentions ImmanuelKant, whose ideas on the Noumenon and Phenomenon were hugely influential on both Husserl and Heidegger.(It has been said, with some justification, that Kant *was* Continental philosophy, and everything else was a footnote to Kant).This is such a glaring oversight that it makes me question the scholarship in the remainder of the book.

The author also spends a good deal of time dealing with Heidegger's brief flirtation with Nazism... but neglects to mention that Heidegger soon fell out of favor with the Nazis and spent most of the Nazi years under a cloud of suspicion.(Perhaps Heidegger never disclaimed Nazism as loudly or as clearly as some would like ... but it's also worth noting that one of his major influences, Edmund Husserl, was Jewish... and of course there is his longtime friendship/love affair with Hannah Arendt, the author of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* and a major thinker in her own right).

Still, this is about as good an introduction to Heidegger as you are likely to find.The author manages to make his concepts of "Dasein" as clear as one can make such an abtruse concept.This will make explorations of Heidegger on your own a bit easier ... but it certainly won't serve as a replacement for same.Unfortunately, there's no way around studying Heidegger in his full glory... much as you may want to avoid the verbiage which was tangled in German and next-to-impossible in translation.

(On the bright side: after slogging through a few pages of Heidegger, Sartre looks like easy reading)

Enormously Helpful
When I first became interested with Heidegger, my first impulse was to tackle the big one- "Being and Time." However, after reading just a few pages of this tome, I realized the material was way over my head. I turned to guides concerning Heidegger's work, and "Introducing Heidegger" was extremely enlightening. Although it is in "comic book" format, the writing, although concise, is full of helpful observations and anecdotes. The pictorial aids also accentuate what the writing describes.
Heidegger's concepts are laid out in full here- from his "secular theology" to his concept of simultaneous disclosure. His observations on art are revealed, also.
This introduction to Heidegger was invaluable to me. I can now recognize strains of Heidegger's thought in the work of writers much easier to read such as Foucault, Sartre, and Jaspers.

A Reader from New York
INTRODUCING HEIDEGGER presents the reader with a lucid and thoughtfully rendered overview of Heidegger's overall corpus. However, this book does not represent a profound encounter with H's original texts by any stretch.Rather, it is a handy reference book, refresher, or study guide. Thepictures are somewhatevocative and illuminating at times, but the bookreminds me -- and this is NOT a slight-- of a well executed Cliff Notesedition. The main virtues of the book include reasonable clarification ofterminology, consideration of H's predecessors and successors in philosophyand other fields, chronological presentation, very concise explication andthe often helpful use of visual art. Still, the book is best for either"absolute beginners" or those who need a handyrefresher/reference. It can also be used alongside original texts ifexisting commentaries seem too abstruse. In any case, it beats HEIDEGGERFOR BEGINNERS. But for those who want more depth and breadth from anintroduction to Heidegger, I reccommend Macquarrie's HEIDEGGER ANDCHRISTIANITY and, secondarilly, George Steiner's HEIDEGGER. These are bothbooks (particularly Macquarrie's) of greater profundity than theINTRODUCTION, yet they are concise and accessible.In sum, INTRODUCINGHEIDEGGER is a fairly reliable short study guide in which some ofphilosophy's most difficult terms and concepts are cleanlyintroduced, ifnot deeply explored. ... Read more

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Aims to transform logic into a reflection on the nature of language. ... Read more

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Difficulty translating shouldn't (always) make for difficult reading!
Heidegger is best read in German. That said, translations can often be illuminating, especially where Heidegger is at his most elusive, grammatically and philosophically. The present English translation of Band 38 of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, however, is disappointing on a number of accounts. Problems both of translation and of overall readability beset the text, many of which, on the whole, could have been allayed by a process of critical and thoroughgoing editing.
While aware of the difficulties which assail any translation of Heidegger, the translators often compromise clarity of expression for the sake of a very suspect literality (the "propinquity of the English to the German" mentioned in the blurb on the back cover), which betrays the "nuances" of the original and the integrity of the English. Elision and at times unnatural German-like constructions and word ordering give rise to new complications of meaning, where the German text reads quite comfortably and unaffectedly. I will give a few examples below. First, however, let me briefly state why the stakes are so high for the translator of this text in particular. (Thus, I will not deal explicitly with the themes, concepts and arguments set forth by Heidegger.)
Because of the biographical intrigue which surrounds this text, the translator ideally has to equilibrate competing demands of conveying a conceptually more abstruse employment of language, and the more mundane, colloquial uses of which Heidegger often avails himself. The course is concerned with 'Sprache,' language (a seemingly simpler term to translate than 'Rede,' discourse, with which Being and Time was concerned), the nature of which is unfolded through a lengthy interrogation of logos. The text, however, based on student transcripts of lectures delivered in the summer course of 1934 at Freiburg, reveals the growing strategic importance of such concepts as 'das Volk,' 'der Fuehrer,' 'das Reich' (all left untranslated in the text)'and so forth, for the overall engagement in the attempt to attain a more originary experience of language, its constitutive role in the determination of the being that Dasein is, and in waging the 'battle' (Kampf) against the traditional elaboration of logic, wherein "our spiritual and historical destiny is decided," as Heidegger puts it.
These themes, while not unknown to 'fundamental ontology,' are nonetheless elaborated here at the height of Heidegger's own political/polemical engagement with National Socialism, after his resignation from the Rectorship, yet during the period in which politics and philosophy are said to become almost indiscernible, his alleged 'Nazism' supposed (according to some) to have assumed a fully legible identity in the guise of philosophical conceptuality. Even 'Arbeit' (labor) and 'Arbeitslosigkeit' (unemployment) figure prominently, which no longer merely refer to "tools" and the artisan's workshop, but take on a directly political significance. The contemporary, if somewhat earlier themes, of re-founding the organization of the university and the sciences on a new principle (decided by ontology) are present as well.
Even here, however, where the vocabulary seems most ordinary, the translators fail to balance the competing demands mentioned above. Does 'Arbeitslosigkeit,' for instance, designate 'unemployment,' entailing a promiscuous foray into the psychology and sociology of the economic hardship of early twentieth-century Germany (whose reality would have weighed so heavily at that time, even to Heidegger's students), as the English text renders it, or a new elaboration of the 'worklessness' of Dasein, whose precise status is undecidable within the economy of these few passages alone. Judging from Heidegger's elaboration of 'Arbeit,' its connection to 'Stimmung' and the 'transferring into the midst of beings' which 'Arbeit' puts into work, it would seem that Heidegger undoubtedly has in mind something that elide mere 'ontic' reification. The translators fail to do justice to the ontological implications of some of these key terms. An injustice which, unfortunately, does not help salve the wound which accusations levied against Heideggerian's of the left and the right, and those averring neutrality on this point, have inflicted, but rather has the adverse effect of adding to the charge of esotericism, and the so-called mysticism which was to abet manifestations of political monstrosity. It is the lack of critical readership, and laisser-aller adoption of Heideggerian terminology, more than anything, more perhaps than Heidegger himself, which has helped detractors lance this spear into the Heideggerian corpus.
Besides this, the text should serve as a solid counterpoint to temper some reductive readings of Heidegger, particularly those which see in the trajectory of his thinking a single straight line, issuing from the rather fragmentary sketches of 'Rede,' discourse, in Being and Time to the so-called mature 'linguistic idealism' of his On the Way to Language, which is said to reveal the truth of the earlier, as yet un- or underdeveloped analyses. We find here a sort of bridge between the Heidegger of 'fundamental ontology' and his later 'turning,' revealing an entirely rich and varied period of reflection whose themes can be detected in his later pronunciations on 'ontotheology,' his contemporary preoccupations with the poetic word, and the earlier seminars dealing with logic and categorial intuition.
As for the more minute points concerning the translation, I aim neither at exhaustiveness nor comprehensiveness; I will limit myself to the more salient oddities of the first few pages, and will simply let the reader take my word that these are rather representative of the translation as a whole.
p.1: 'die Entdeckung des rechten Vollzugs derselben und ein Sichauskennen darin,' is translated 'the discovery of the right execution of the same and a being familiar within.' To translate 'derselben' with 'the same,' without the accompanying noun or noun phrase of which it is 'the same,' introduces an unnecessary ambiguity into the English which is not there for the German reader, who has the added clarity of gender and case. Also, 'darin' is not simply 'within,' but '(with)in it,' referring to the same 'it' to which 'derselben' refers. Where the German can economize by use of pronouns, the English, suffering from a deficit of gender and case, calls for elaboration: here, the tedium of repetition is a small price to pay for clarity.
p.2: 'Die Ordnung von Grund und Folge,' where 'Grund und Folge' are translated as 'Reason and Consequence.' Granted, 'Der Satz vom Grund' is known to English readers the world over as 'The Principle of Reason.' However, it presumes a more imaginative reader, where no further incitation is given, to realize what the relation between 'reason' and 'consequence' is, i.e. that every thing that is a consequence of something has a reason, i.e. a ground, for being (the consequence that it is). But here, the relation of determination is lost in such a formula as 'reason' and 'consequence.'
p.3: 'in seiner bzw. ihrer Selbigkeit,' reads the German, where the translators give: 'in its respective self-sameness.' The 'bzw.' (beziehungsweise), which simply means 'or,' or 'or, as the case may be,' etc., here refers to the differentiation of gender which the dualnoun-subject of 'Selbigkeit,' mentioned just prior, calls for in German. No such distinction obtains in English, which does not differentiate between gender. Thus, 'bzw.' is made, in the English, to refer to the 'Selbigkeit' itself, rather than to the possibility that the subject of this 'Selbigkeit' may be either masculine or feminine.
p.3: 'd.h.,' (das heisst), is rendered 'that means,' a very un-English way of saying 'that is, i.e.' and which makes the sentence as a whole improbable to an English reader.
p.4: 'Das Aussagen begegnet uns...' is rendered: 'Asserting encounters us...' Literal, yes. But this is a very simple construction in German, which ought simply to be rendered: 'We encounter, come across... etc.'
p.6: 'und mit uns gehen' is translated: 'and [they] go with us.' Literal to a tee. The context, however, implies not that the 'adversaries' accompany 'us' somewhere, but that they are in agreement, i.e., are 'allies' in the argument on this particular point.
p.7: 'gegen etwas zu Felde ziehen' is again a rather colloquial way of saying 'to take up arms against something,' 'to crusade or wage battle against.' The translation, 'to take the field against,' wanting to preserve the 'propinquity' of English to German, would better be rendered: 'to take to the (battle) field against...' The literality misses the militaristic, and once more historically fateful rhetoric of H.'s 'mandate' and 'Kampf.'
p.7: 'und damit alle Auseinandersetzung' is translated: 'and with this all confrontation.' Although 'damit' can serve as a conjunction, meaning 'thereby,' and so forth, here it is undoubtedly the object of 'Auseinanderstzung,' which would be better translated as something like: 'and all attempts to come to terms with this,' i.e. to enter into a confrontational explication of it.
The reader may find some of the objections listed above excessively critical, but these very simple grammatical errors add up. 'Dann' is obsessively rendered 'then' on almost every occasion where it appears, which is often entirely expendable in the English. Of course, this text is not geared toward the Heideggerian scholarly community in particular, but for those readers looking for a greater acquaintance with Heidegger, and to do so through the facility of their native tongue. The English reader will, I suspect, find himself tripping over some of the more awkward constructions in this book, and will even be left wondering as to the very enigmatic meaning of some passages, even when H. seems to assert himself quite clearly and without obfuscation: where Heidegger simply asserts, the English sounds oracular.
Overall, a strong addition to the Heideggerian English corpus, but a less than savory treat for Anglophones. For those wishing to gain a greater grasp of Heidegger's treatment of language and logos, I would suggest consulting the German. To those looking for an introduction to Heidegger's views, start with 'The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic,' whose concerns are, it is true, different, but which will serve in the long run as a much better guide.
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A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work. ... Read more

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A Great Book
I would consider Being and Time to be one of the greatest works in all of philosophy. While the work itself is very dense Heidegger's work is nothing short of amazing. ... Read more

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Volume 18 of Martin Heidegger's collected works presents his important 1924 Marburg lectures which anticipate much of the revolutionary thinking that he subsequently articulated in Being and Time. Here are the seeds of the ideas that would become Heidegger's unique phenomenology. Heidegger interprets Aristotle's Rhetoric and looks closely at the Greek notion of pathos. These lectures offer special insight into the development of his concepts of care and concern, being-at-hand, being-in-the-world, and attunement, which were later elaborated in Being and Time. Available in English for the first time, they make a significant contribution to ancient philosophy, Aristotle studies, Continental philosophy, and phenomenology.

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"For an acquaintance with the thought of Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? is as important as Being and Time. It is the only systematic presentation of the thinker's late philosophy and . . . it is perhaps the most exciting of his books."--Hannah Arendt ... Read more

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Nietzsche & Parmenides/Legein & Noein
I believe that this book is the best starting point for being introduced into Heidegger's thought, not "Being and Time". The reason being that this book "What is Called Thinking" was not created under academic pressure, nor is it trying to prove its associations with previous philosophers, and being last - is the most precise and clearest distillation of Heidgger's position - after a lifetime of tinkering with the basic ideas of Dasein.

This is some of Heideggers last lectures compiled into a two part book. The first part concerns itself with Nietzsche - the ideas of the "last man", the uberman (meta-man), the bridge, blinking, redemption/forgiveness, and eternal-return-of-the-same. The second part concerns itself with Parmenides' poetic clarification of usefullness and thinking as "Legein" (to lay out - the verb form of 'logos') together with "Noein" (to take to heart - the verb form of 'nouos') and their intimate interrelationship. Together they result in "Eon" - the original form of "to be".

This book was successfully used in by a "Heidegger Hermeneutic Circle" as the introductory text into Heidegger's opus.

recommendation
The purchase was very simple, and they had the available book, the times and delivery of the product was made under the engaged conditions. I recommend this company for their quality and responsibility.

Questionable translation
"What is called thinking" needs to be translated by connotation. Not only do I speak English but also fluently German. "Was heißt denken", by Martin Heidegger, translates best "What does it mean to think?" That translation gives it life, as Martin Heidegger obviously intended his question.
The way this book was translated is out of sink or understanding with Heidegger or any Greek philosopher like Aristotle, and especially not Nietzsche or Hölderlin. Actually it reads boring to the core.

Rainbow Bridge
One of Heidegger's most readable works, especially book 1 (book 2 has lots of untranslated Greek words), I found the real message to be in his interpretation of the Rainbow -for Nietzsche representing the end of revenge sponsored thoughts and actions, and the bridge from man to the uberMensch.All in all a very uplifting and valuable read.

A Book that Produces Thinking
This is an important work of philosophy, but it's probably a mistake to look in it for a statement about the nature of thought.Rather, Heidegger seeks to open up thinking, for himself and for the reader (originally the listeners of this lecture course).The questions he asks are as important, if not more so, as any potential answers.And as with almost all works of Heidegger after Being and Time, Heidegger's writing constitutes a kind of performance which fends off easy, facile conclusions.Objections to the idiosyncracies of his style fail to recognize that Heidegger's style is inseperable from the sort of open-ended thinking he promotes.Of all the many questions he asks, the most important is, "What calls for thinking?"We do not simply decide to think, according to Heidegger, but rather Being, the Being of beings, calls on us to think, and thereby realizes itself through our thinking.To read Heidegger is to step back from your everyday, taken-for-granted assumptions and thereby create a space for reflection.And this, as he says, is a gift. ... Read more

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Written by a former student of Heidegger, this book examines the relationship between the philosophy and the politics of a celebrated teacher and the allure that Nazism held out for scholars committed to revolutionary nihilism. ... Read more

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Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), written in 1936-38 and first published in 1989 as Beitrge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), is Heidegger's most ground-breaking work after the publication of Being and Time in 1927.If Being and Time is perceived as undermining modern metaphysics, Contributions undertakes to reshape the very project of thinking. ... Read more

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Preliminary concerns beginning to mature
I have only begun to study this book, but I bring to it 35 years of living with awareness of Heidegger's work and struggling with many of his texts. So far it seems to me that this work is a struggle to do what he confessed he could not do--overcome metaphysics or cross-over to a second beginning.

My German is so primitive that I could never read this text in its original language. I see that saves me from feeling a need to compete with this translation. I am thankful for small blessings. The unique poetic vocabulary invented by H to avoid metaphysics and promote the cross-over presents a challenge.

The unique vocabulary by Emad and Maly means I must not depend on solitary words, even while H is at such pains to set them in context. (On continued study of this book, I am increasingly admiring of the translation, with the picyune exception of the use of English words with "-ness" and "-hood" that typically shout *metaphysics.*)

As with Sein und Zeit which I first read about 30 years ago and then reread 5 years ago, I can only resort to a developing appreciation of this volume. It is hard work for me.

Yet I should not want to die without even a meager acquaintance, as mine is, with our age's version of Aristotle. Even he was libeled for political incompetence. Opportunities such as are offered in this volume do not come around everyday.

Upon beginning the reading I would have been satisfied to call what I found a Heidegger "worldview;" that is, avoidance of philosophy as erudition. Yet early on H makes clear it is philosophy he is doing, because philosophy, contrary to worldview, calls itself into question. That thread is built around H's sense of our distress and a need to accept it. Is that an answer as found in metaphysics and worldviews? Only if it is an unsettled settlement, a willingness to stay on a path with no end in view.

Addendum
Herrmann, the editor, tells us that he moved what began as the second of the eight joinings (not chapters) of the text, "Be-ing," to the very end in accord with a note by Heidegger. Overwhelmed by the volume, I have now concentrated study on that final section which H's note characterized as "an attempt to grasp the whole once again." I do find that reading and rereading it does help my understanding; maybe even enough so that one day I can return to the other sections. That is, if I am able to recover my balance from the stunning assertions now coming through.

A Reader's Digest or Cliff Notes version might go something like this: Although the ancient Greeks alerted us long ago to the differentiation between a being or beings and be-ing as such, from Anaximander to Nietzsche (the last great philosopher) be-ing as such has only been understood on the basis of a being or beings. As a consequence, it does not bother us that being as such is treated as most-being or being in general. It ought to bother us a lot, for all the confusion it has caused and for the emptiness it has left us with.

Whenever it was we came to realize that we are mortals and that we can predict our inevitable end-of-life, we also were offered the opportunity to realize ourselves as historical. That is, we come to realize that as there was something here before we got here (rendering us as thrown) there will also be something after we are gone. How does it happen that we so seldom wonder about that amazing state of affairs? Or wonder about it at least as much or more than we wonder about what things, entities, objects, beings are made of? That blind spot is what ought to bother us.

Maybe we still have a chance to recover from our neglect. We have hints of another beginning to philosophy scattered in both the triumphs and the failures of Western thinking. In addition, we have the phenomenon of language, with all its possibilities. If we think of language as a gift to us, maybe even a gift from be-ing as such, we might reassess our place. We then could think of ourselves as granted that gift of language in order to be guardians of be-ing as such. And then we could see ourselves as participants in "the sway of be-ing," which is a kind of destiny, our destiny and our truth. If nothing else, our lives then can be richer in contingencies.

The hardest part is being silent enough to hear what, if anything, be-ing has to say to us. Our history back to most ancient times is seeking for ground when abground is t/here. We account for it by naming it "nothing," but that misses it. (ed. note: Sartre's mistake?) The poets enable us to hear the message of the gods, even while they are few who can bear to listen.

My study of section "VIII. Be-ing," has steadily increased my appreciation for a feature that drew me to Heidegger originally:his insistence and capacity for coherence. His task is both to account for how we have arrived at our ontological predicament and then to offer hints of further possibilities. It is his welcoming of "possibility" that currently most intrigues, as ordinary philosophy gives little weight to the concept.

His innovative vocabulary mimics what must have been his experience studying the Attic Greeks where meaning only emerges in a context of otherwise undefined words. Heidegger's new concepts depend on the whole context of his work. Innovative vocabulary is the task he assigns to poiesis, and its measure is the horizon of our understanding. We can think only as far as our concepts will take us.

Heidegger's "Second Masterpiece"
Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning" is generally regarded as a second masterpiece, following his unfinished Being and Time, in which he reworked some of the major ideas that were explored in the earlier text. If you are interested in a good scholarly understanding Heidegger via a series of landmark texts that will lead you to the core of Heidegger's thought then this is definitely a must-read.

The Contributions, written after the famous Heideggerian "Turn" and after his fateful involvement with the "inner truth and greatness of the movement" is of a level of sophistication that is unmatched. Arranged in terms of a series of distinct but interrelated parts, the text overcomes the problems encountered in Being and Time and takes off thinking to new heights.

It is unbelievable Indiana Press let this translation become a book
It is unbelievable Indiana Press let this translation become a book.

Beitrage Zur Philosophie
I recommend that first you pour yourself a glass of wine, drink it and relax and dip into...Now what was he saying about Enowing and the Ones to Come and the Last God and all...? That's right, chill out with the Magician from Messkirch. let Der Man speak his words. this is Beitrage Zur Philosophie, baby. The Big Think. Gotta ride this wave. It will take you someplace to think about.

At Least he didn't call this book:Sick Puppy.
I am not overly familiar with this book.It is the most recent translation of a major work by Heidegger that I have seen this year, and I thought I ought to look into it to see if the thinking around Heidegger is getting any better for me personally.The more I know about philosophy, the less I have to read to start getting an opinion of my own, and a page of this stuff was usually enough to put me in a different frame of mind.Plowing on after I lost my idea of whatever thread I was following had a tendency to be soporific, so I recommend this book to people who have a lot of time to sleep.

There is a little section 72, "Nihilism" on pages 96-8 which makes me think philosophy must mean a lot less now than when Nietzsche inspired Heidegger to write, "Nihilism in Nietzsche's sense means that all goals are gone" (p. 96).For the 20th century to produce a great philosopher like Heidegger and put him in the midst of some of the greatest political foolishness of the 20th century, and have most professional philosophers think that he was showing too much activism when he joined the Nazi party, but was being extremely professional when he managed to maintain his standing in the party while Hitler was in power by not saying anything bad about Hitler, makes me think the comedians of the age might have been in a better position to do some political thinking.In the movie, "The Dance of Genghis Cohn," a little dummy that looks like Hitler was the kind of funny bit which got the comedian beat up by some younger members of the Nazi party right after the show.That kind of German society seems to be what Heidegger has most on his mind in his description of nihilism."Proof for this is the gigantically organized event for shouting down this anxiety. . . . The most disastrous nihilism consists in passing oneself off as protector of Christianity . . . on the basis of social accomplishments" (p. 97).Younger people than Heidegger have found a lot of individual ways for having goals, and the main reason that they haven't been able to put it together is that a collection like the United Stoners of America is not naturally cohesive.Heidegger was a long way from wanting that to be so out in the open.He must attempt to be so philosophical that his last sentence for the section on nihilism is "Instead this awareness must recognize the abandonment of being as essential sway.(p. 98). ... Read more

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The ideas of Martin Heidegger, one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, have had a profound influence on work in literary theory and aesthetics, as well as on mainstream philosophy. This book offers a clear and concise guide to Heidegger’s notoriously complex writings, while giving special attention to his major work Being and Time. Richard McDonough adds historical context by exploring Heidegger’s intellectual roots in German idealism and ancient Greek philosophy, and introduces readers to the key themes in Heidegger’s work including Dasein, Existenz,time, conscience, death, and phenomenology. This book, which also considers Heidegger’s controversial ethics (or "anti-ethics") and politics, would make an excellent text for both introductory and advanced undergraduate courses on existentialism, phenomenology, continental philosophy, and Heidegger himself. ... Read more

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"Being" is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive
I read this book for a graduate seminar on philosophy.Richard McDonough's book helps to illuminate one of the most influential philosophical books of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," deconstructing phenomenology.Heidegger's kind of phenomenology has to do with the idea of phenomenon, which means something that appears and shows itself.His criticism of traditional philosophy is that it gets started with categories, concepts, and notions, departing from the way human comprehension of this world first shows itself.This is Aristotelian and Aristotle is an enormous influence on Heidegger.

Yet, there is something very radical going on here, and that is the idea of "being" is connected to meaning and negativity.In the history of philosophy, being has a positive concept, something that "is" thus, the opposite of being is none being.Heidegger wants to show how the meaning of being is distorted by this understanding of being as a purely positive concept, as a "thing" a full present entity.For Example, he also very much critiques in modern art, the modern conception of objectivity, the world is transformed into an object independent of art, of its significance, its meaning, or interest in it.This was due in large part because of modern science, and its strong sense of objectification converting nature into a set of mere objects, time, and space that are measurable and analyzable through scientific means.Meaning, importance, and significance for Heidegger equals value; science and nature have none of this as pure objects.Therefore, anything of meaning, and of significance would be transferred into the subject it would be simply the human estimation, nature itself has no meaning or significance in that respect.

Heidegger critiques this scientific model.As he says in his phenomenology, "Well how is it that human existence first understands itself?Here he is talking about things that are very ordinary and complex.We are in a world that has significance, it is meaningful to us, it matters to us, it fits into our interests in such a way that we are absorbed into its significance.So, when we come across the world, first and foremost it is not a mere object that is standing apart from us or our mind, but rather it has significant elements of our environment that fit into our lives.Some things are significant, or they are useful, or dangerous, or satisfying, etc.What Heidegger wants to say in his phenomenology is we have to pay attention to this way of being.Therefore, first and foremost he says "being" matters, it matters to us."Being" is a significance, it is not just a bare object or a bare fact.Heidegger doesn't accept this idea of subject on one side and object on the other side, that means that when humans have their understanding of the world, it is not just a human projection, it is not just a human construction.It is a revealing way of seeing; it is world disclosive.The meaning of the world wouldn't happen without us, because we are the ones that find it meaningful.Therefore, it is most important to understand that for Heidegger there is no object subject distinction.The term he uses to illustrate his idea is "Dasien" which means "human existence," Heidegger chooses it because he doesn't want to deal with the subject, or mind or consciousness, he wants to use a word that does not subjectivefy things.He uses "Dasien" as "humans being there" in this world and not just staying apart from it.

Humans are a being in the world, a term he uses is, "we dwell" in the world, we don't come across it as some bare thing in the world we "dwell" in it.Therefore, "meaningfulness" is a primary notion of being.Secondly, the meaning of "being" is connected with the notion of negativity.This is the notion of "being" moving toward death, and anxiety.Thus, the way that humans understand being is in part because of opposite of non-being and death is a perfect example of that.Humans are distinct because we understand that we are mortal, that we die.We are aware of death even when we are not in danger, which means we understand being and our world.Heidegger made a lot out of the fact that the Greeks understood this, that they were mortals, and that was no accident he thought.That death is a primary aspect of what it means to be human.If you are aware of death as he says, then you can be aware of the meaning of life.The meaning of life comes to us because we understand that we are finite, that we are mortal and not in control.

Another way to understand Heidegger is a wonderful analysis of the idea that the word "being" has become a noun in philosophy, like first things of beings, or things that are.Yet Heidegger says in the Greek language and other western languages this idea of "being" grammatically in language is derived from a verb, the primary verb "to be."Moreover, as a verb it is tensed which means it has to do with time.All verbs are tensed, even Aristotle said, "That is the difference between a verb and a noun."The difference between a verb and a noun, a verb is something that has to do with time, not just action, but time.That is why all verbs are tensed as future, and past.The very fact that time is another perfect indication of negativity, because time is ever changing, ever moving, and when we are in the present, the past is time of negativity it is no longer.When we are in the present, the future is kind of negative it is not yet.Yet we understand these negatives as meaningful, that is why we can get upset about the past that it is not happening anymore, and why we can become excited about the future even though it hasn't happened yet, they have meaning to us.

Another important feature of Heidegger's book is where he takes on the notion of skepticism.Skepticism is a classic problem in philosophy, it is really fostered by Descartes and Hume, and it has to do with the subject/object division.Skeptics argue that the mind is on one side of the fence, the outside world is on the other side, and the mind is something that comes across the world and just processes it, according to its categories of thinking, this is a very common modern construction of skepticism.If this skeptical construct were true, then it is very possible for someone to ask the question; "well how do we know that our minds that are on this side of the fence can ever really know that it is accurately talking about what is on the other side of the fence?If it is separated like this, how can we be sure that what we think about is actually the case?Heidegger is not talking here about ordinary skepticism, like wonder or "I am not sure" kind of skepticism; but what Heidegger argues against is the kind of radical skepticism, which asks, can we be sure of any of our knowledge.This idea plays on two objects, the subject object divide if we are on this side of the subject how can we ever know we are accurately talking about something.Secondly, is the certainty because the skeptic is someone who says well, "I really want to find with 100% certainty, and if I can find any reason for doubt then I am not going to commit.Heidegger says this is a classic philosophical problem that doesn't make any sense whatsoever.Because, no existing human self could ever radically call into question its environment and this world.It doesn't make any sense.You can call into question this or that aspect of it, but never the whole thing and never to say; "well it's possible that what humans say about the world may not have anything to do with the world."Even Descartes and Hume knew this was perverse, but they said this is what philosophy has to do.Radical skepticism is perverse to Heidegger.Skeptics like Descartes and Hume if right why are they writing to an audience.The very practice of skepticism undermines the idea of skepticism.Heidegger says, "Well if our practices betray the project of skepticism, which even Hume admits, he says I would go mad."You can't live as a radical skeptic.This skepticism can apply to things like morals and beauty values and artistic things, because they don't satisfy strict standards of knowledge and certainty.

To reiterate, it is important to know that Heidegger primarily wants to say that the meaning of being, is something that humans are involved with in a significant meaningful way, and it can't be either subjective or objective, those two ideas he says are polarizations that both account for how the world matters to us.The fact that it matters to us means it can't be a pure objective thing.Secondly, the fact that what matters to us is our world not just our opinions and our inner dispositions mean it can't be just a subjective thing.We are absorbed in the world; we are caught up in it.Heidegger's phenomenology wants to give voice to these notions rather than start with the modern categories of subjectivity and objectivity.

I recommend this work for anyone interested in philosophy, epistemology, and ontology.
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