e99 Online Shopping Mall
Help | |
Home - Book Author - Clausewitz Carl Von (Books) |
  | 1-14 of 14 |
click price to see details click image to enlarge click link to go to the store
1. On WarVolume 1 by Carl von, 1780-1831 Clausewitz | |
Kindle Edition:
Pages
(2006-02-26)
list price: US$0.99 -- used & new: US$0.99 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: B000JQU6S6 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description |
2. On war. Edited with an introd. by Anatol Rapoport by Carl von (1780-1831) Clausewitz | |
Hardcover:
Pages
(1968)
Asin: B000XJF1YI Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
3. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy by Michael Handel | |
Hardcover: 352
Pages
(1996-10-03)
list price: US$170.00 -- used & new: US$170.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0714632945 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Customer Reviews (1)
An Excellent Addition to Your Strategic Theory Library |
4. On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas by Hugh Smith | |
Paperback: 272
Pages
(2005-03-02)
list price: US$29.95 -- used & new: US$29.95 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 1403935874 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description Customer Reviews (1)
Great Work in Strategic Theory |
5. Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy by Stephen Cimbala | |
Hardcover: 218
Pages
(1991-08-01)
list price: US$170.00 -- used & new: US$164.71 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0714634204 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
6. Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power by Peter Paret | |
Hardcover: 252
Pages
(1992-06)
list price: US$39.50 -- used & new: US$30.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0691031991 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description |
7. Clausewitz and Contemporary War by Antulio J. Echevarria II | |
Hardcover: 264
Pages
(2007-11-17)
list price: US$80.00 -- used & new: US$61.20 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0199231915 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description |
8. Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia by Isab Duyvesteyn | |
Hardcover: 256
Pages
(2004-12-02)
list price: US$170.00 -- used & new: US$43.16 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0714657247 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description |
9. Clausewitz, Philosopher of War (A Touchstone book) by Raymond Aron | |
Paperback: 418
Pages
(1986-09)
list price: US$9.95 Isbn: 0671628267 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Customer Reviews (1)
Awful translation |
10. Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy by Stephen J. Cimbala | |
Hardcover: 240
Pages
(2000-11-30)
list price: US$119.95 -- used & new: US$113.00 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0275969517 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description Customer Reviews (2)
Cimbala keeps beating the same dead horse The remainder of the book, though, rehashes themes that Cimbala has covered in significant depth in the past. He uses the examples of Russian war planning at the start of WWI, US/Soviet relations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and nuclear war planning to demonstrate how inflexible plans and thoughtless leaders can precipitate undesired wars. In this, the book is a simple repeat of his earlier book, Military Persuasion. Cimbala does include two thoughful chapters that expand his earlier themes and contribute to the study of friction in modern, information driven conflicts: one on NATO action in Kosovo, and one on the Gulf War of 1991. Both chapters are useful and highlight his thesis that war planning in the information age is just as susceptible to friction as it was 100 years ago. Overall, those interested in friction in policy decisions, or friction in information war will find the book useful. Those who have read some of Cimbala's other works can safely pass this one up.
Doctrine, Discipline, Intelligence, & Initiative = Victory The author, and this book, may well be among the strongest elements of what I perceive to be a growing backlash against the prevalent technophelia characteristic of the military-industrial complex that President and General Eisenhower warned us against--a technophelia that advocates a "system of systems" with no provision for strategy, doctrine, or intelligence; and a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that looks to micro-UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and robotic ants as the primary means for defeating any enemy.We will simply assume every enemy will conveniently expose themselves to the narrow range of capabilities that we have devised at great expense! The author provides as good a review of "friction" in war and in policy as one could hope for.Although sometimes tedious and not always easy to follow, this book is a must for any serious scholar of future conflicts between states, nations, and organizations.Above all, this book is a giant compressed Castor Oil pill for the techno-meisters so eager to believe they can shape a world where our money and our technology can overcome every obstacle and every opponent. A few highlights intended to recommend the purchase of this book and its digestion: 1) Friction is not receiving the attention it merits from modern social scientists, including all those on the Department of Defense payroll.We still conceptualize our capabilities along techno-rational lines instead of human-normal chaos lines. 2) It is the combination of thoughtful doctrine, individual and unit discipline, initiative at all levels, and good intelligence (individual, organic, and external) that leads to victory through the reduction of friction--what General Alfred M. Gray, former Commandant of the Marine Corps institutionalized with his concept of "commander's intent" on top of training for war with the assumption that communications and computing *will* collapse in the heat of battle. 3) Although very brief in his coverage of intelligence per se, the author is helpful in reviewing Clausewitz's top eight sources of friction, the first three of which deal with information: insufficient knowledge of the enemy; unreliable information from patrols and spies; and uncertain knowledge of our own capabilities and dispositions.The author administers the coup de grace to technophiles with some elegant quotes from these worthies claiming that the new world of satellite intelligence is taking us to a non-Clauswitzian world where friction can be overcome by "information superiority"--these are the same folks that cannot find Bin Laden and had to invade Panama in order to capture Noriega--the same folks that let a warlord in Somalia run amok and let a small crowd chase away a U.S. Navy ship of war from docking in Haiti...the same folks that ignore 18 distinct genocide campaigns on-going today, with all that implies in terms of forced migration and epidemic disease and failed states and rampant destabilizing crime. 4) The author's review of groupthink (Janis) and how this leads to policy fiasco's is very worthwhile, not only because it is acutely relevant to how we are making decisions today in defense, energy, health, and fiscal policy, but because it highlights so clearly the dangers that come from a leadership that thinks it is invulnerable, morally superior, self-censored, sharing illusions of unanimity, subject to stereotyped visions of the world, and--worst of all--protected from reality by self appointed "mind guards" who put direct pressure on "deviant" naysayers (or dump them from the team). 5) The author is one of the few to focus on the impact of friction on what Clausewitz calls the ultimate disconnect, that between ends and means in war.As America prepares to rethink its military force structure, it is especially appropriate to note that we are planning to downsize the conventional forces while investing heavily in electronic capabilities, at the same time that the most advanced thinkers have moved beyond asymmetric war to non-traditional soft power including major emphasis on disease control, water preservation, transnational law enforcement, and major diplomatic and economic assistance options.Looking at today's situation through the author's eyes and this book, one can see that we do not have a strategy; we don't even try to understand what everyone else's strategy might be; and we are completely ignoring the need to fully integrate home front and overseas defense, foreign affairs, and trade strategy and capabilities management. Over the course of 7 chapters, the author reviews friction both at the policy/acquisition level and the operational level of command, in relation to irrelevant and inflexible war plans; nuclear crisis management; within Desert Storm; in small wars, "faux wars" and peace operations; in modern deterrence; and in relation to mass destruction and information warfare paradigms.In the latter instance, he is acutely sensitive to the teachings of Dr. Steve Blank, that one man's information "warning" attack is another man's signal for "total war"--witness Russian doctrine that considers a C4I attack to be fundamental and requiring an immediate "dead hand" retaliatory attack. The author concludes the book with a review of simple, compound, and complex friction in policy and operations, with examples, and for this section alone the book merits inclusion in any serious library concerned with international security. ... Read more |
11. Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret | |
Paperback: 496
Pages
(1985-12-01)
list price: US$33.00 -- used & new: US$66.49 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 069100806X Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Customer Reviews (6)
"Essential Military History Library" book
From Idealist to Realist
Illuminating Biography of Military Theorist Clausewitz was born into a middle-class family in Prussia in the late 18th Century.His father, not being a noble, was unable to retain his provisional officer rank of lieutenant he had achieved during the Seven Years War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theater of operations).Thus a subtext of Clausewitz and his family's dubious pretentions to nobility that were finally "recognized" in the wake of his own and to a lesser extent his brother's-who also became a lesser known general-achievements. Clausewitz and his older brother were farmed out to the military by their father in 1792 when Clausewitz was 12 years old as officer cadets during the Wars of the French Revolution and he served in the military throughout the entire Napoleonic period and thereafter rising to the rank of major general.It was this highly charged political atmosphere that conditioned Clausewitz' world view and made him-along with his mentor Gerhard Scharnhorst-realize that the old set piece notions of war which played out like a chess game held in a gentleman's club between rival aristocratic principalities were no longer viable.It also gave added fuel to his and the other "reformers" views that certain social changes were needed to neutralize the appeal of the French Revolution.Thus they called for the scaling back of aristocratic privilege and the building of a military based on broader nationalist and meritocratic bases.They also emphasized, ironically given the reputation of mindless obedience that Prussian militarism retained, the importance of inculcating troops with a spirit of self reliance which involved de-emphasizing dogma and promoting analytical thinking that could form the basis for decision making in unforseen circumstances of crisis. These ideas took on greater urgency after Prussia's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of Napolean in 1806 in a few weeks of fighting (when Clausewitz was taken prisoner and actually was granted an audience with the French Emperor)- a situation that ironically suggests the fate of France of 1940, but this in the era of horse cavalry!-resulting in Napolean and the Grand Armee marching triumphantly through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.As a result Prussia was for a number of years reduced to a virtual vassal state of France, not unlike what Vichy France was to Germany a century and half later, and when war broke out again in 1812 it was forced to take the side of Napolean.This was deeply offensive to patriotic and nationalist advocates like Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and others like Field Marshal Gneisenau and ultimately Clausewitz decamped to Russia where he became involved with the "Russo-German Legion" which after Napoleon's reverses there was able to first convince the Prussian commander Yorck to switch sides and then Prussia-like Italy in WW2-to do the same.Clausewitz then went with the "Allied" armies all the way to Paris and thereafter fought in a rear guard action at Waterloo. The sweetness of this victory for him and others (Sharnhorst having died on the field of battle in 1813) was muted by the extreme reactionary turn of the victors towards resurrecting old time aristocratic and monarchical privilege, something Clauswitz from his vantage point of a military instructor in Berlin saw as holding back both Prussia and Germany's social and political development internally towards becoming a modern nation state and only adding fuel to the fire of discontent throughout Europe.Moreover, his reputation as a bourgois, if not "liberal", reformer caused his career to stall.It was in this context, that returned to line duty, he died of cholera while observing the events of the revolution of 1830 in Poland. The book's shortcoming is its dense style which makes its ideas less accessible than they could be.Moreover, the ideas of its subject could be elucidated better; the author relies too heavily on extended quotations from his subject's work.For example, an entire chapter of On War is reproduced with little gloss. After having read this book, I saw a documentary about James Cameron's recent mission to the wreck of the battleship Bismarck and was able to appreciate its references to two of the heavy cruisers in that great warship's battle group: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.Finally, for what it's worth, we can speculate about what Clausewitz' view of later German military history might have been, but one conclusion seems inescapable: he would have found Hitler's invasion of Russia a collosal blunder breathtaking in its ingnorance of the lessons of history which resulted in a similar outcome that snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
The Real Clausewitz This exceptional book by PeterParet not only gives interesting information on Clausewitz the soldier andthe man, but also explains the interesting enigma that was Prussia before,during, and after the Napoleonic Wars.This is not a companion book toanything, but a well-researched volume that stands on its own asauthoritative history. Paret goes into detail on why Prussia wasdefeated, and its army destroyed by Napoleon in the cataclysm of 1806. Conversely, the thoughtful, professional soldiers who sought to rebuildthat army, 'with vengeance very much in mind' are developed to the extentthat they are perceived as human without the false front of a textbook. Excellently reserarched from original sources and credible secondaryones, Paret also goes in depth to cover the Prussian 'War of Liberation' ofGermany from the French, the liberation in large part meaning annexation byPrussia.Additionally, he also explains that the Prussian civilianpopulation, somewhat a thing apart from the Prussian army, was persuaded,by force if necessary, to participate in the wars in 1813-1814. This bookgoes a long way into explaining Clausewitz and his times, is worthfavorable, consideration, and belongs on the bookshelf of every thoughtfulstudent.
Provides an excellent start to the study of Clausewitz |
12. Clausewitz: A Biography by Roger Parkinson | |
Paperback: 352
Pages
(2002-12-25)
list price: US$17.95 -- used & new: US$10.16 (price subject to change: see help) Asin: 0815412339 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Editorial Review Book Description Customer Reviews (4)
Biography on Clausewitz; what a concept!
Clausewitz, and the Wars That Made Him
The Story of a Military Man
A classic and highly scholarly study of military theory |
13. Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini by Michael I. Handel | |
Paperback: 176
Pages
(1992-09)
list price: US$15.00 Isbn: 0714640875 Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
14. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought by Michael Handel | |
Hardcover: 344
Pages
(1996-10-31)
list price: US$55.00 Isbn: 0714646741 Average Customer Review: Canada | United Kingdom | Germany | France | Japan | |
Customer Reviews (6)
Comparative study
Comprehensive
An Accessible Analysis of the Art of War
Essential reference.
Ideal for the academic, In the course of his analysis, Handel sets out to compare and contrast the different schools of thought that 'the greats' developed, with particular attention being paid to Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz.Perhaps this is where the text comes into its own for the academic.If one was to consider writing a study on the conduct and role of the military in this day and age, this book brings not only Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz, but also Jomini and Machiavelli into focus.The student will hardly require a more comprehensive guide to different schools of thought for the construction of their essays. In conclusion therefore, I would reaffirm my belief that this text would prove invaluable for any classical military analyst trying to find a text helping and perhaps reducing the amount of time devoted to sifting through Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' and Von Clausewitz's 'On War'.However, taken out of this context, although highly readable, it is perhaps beyond the requirement of the casual reader whom might be better served reading abridged texts of the originals first. ... Read more |
  | 1-14 of 14 |