Customer Reviews (1)

BEWARE:BOOK IS IN GERMAN
This book is written/published entirely in German.Unfortunately, there is no mention of this anywhere on the item description.I found this out upon receipt of the book. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (10)

A great soldier handed an impossible task
This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs.Barbara W. Tuchman's book is a "riveting" biography of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who was one of America's ablest military leaders asked to perform the near impossible in World War II--train and command a Chinese Army to fight against the Japanese.Tuchman`s purpose of using Stilwell's long connections with China which started in 1911 when he was a U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant, was to explore three historical strands.First, by using a plethora of sources, including Stilwell's diaries, she excelled in her purpose of providing an unusually candid biography of Stilwell's remarkable life.Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who personally observed Stilwell's first-rate military abilities as a trainer and leader of men, "...selected Stilwell for the post and felt responsible for having consigned him to an ill-supported mission and wasted the talents of an officer he respected as one of America's ablest field commanders" (391).However, early in Stillwell's career he came to be known by his moniker "Vinegar Joe," for his scowl whenever he thought someone or something went awry.His diary was full of pejoratives describing most British officers as "limeys," the French as "frogs," and when he soon lost all respect for Chiang he referred to him as "peanut."Though Tuchman throughout her biography displayed a great admiration for Stilwell, her caricature of Stilwell is as a man who did not possess the political skills necessary of a high-ranking officer to effectively lead a multi-national coalition in the China-India-Burma theatre of operations.

Tuchman's second purpose was to use Stilwell's four visits and postings in China as the backdrop to explain China's turbulent years--1911 through 1945.This part of her book lacked the depth necessary to provide the reader a good grounding in truly understanding the ever-shifting political situation in China.However, through this strand of her book, Tuchman was able to show how Stilwell had a "missionary's" love and concern for the plight of China's "teeming masses."Throughout his various observations of China's military in his capacity as America's military attaché from 1935 to 1937, Stilwell came to have, "...confidence in Chinese soldiers as fighting material and believed that if properly led they could become the equal of any army in the world" (172).

Third, Tuchman used Stilwell's life to explore America's foreign policy relationship with China, starting with America's Open Door Policy, but mainly focusing on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR's) desire that America could find in China a democratic partner to help block and eventually crush Japan's increasing influence in Asia.Unfortunately Tuchman, through no fault of her own because there is a scant written record on the subject, was unable to understand the crux of FDR's strategic purpose in first supporting Chiang with a naïve reverence, which ultimately undercut Stilwell's ability to get the Chinese Army to engage the Japanese in battle.However, once FDR witnessed Chiang's ineptitude at the Cairo Conference of 1943, he saw Chiang in the same light that Stilwell did.However, it was too late to provide Stilwell the political help he needed to use the Chinese army in a truly meaningful way to affect the wars outcome.Tuchman's book serves historians best as a biography of one of America's most able but tragically wasted generals of World War II.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.

A great soldier handed an impossible task
This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs.Barbara W. Tuchman's book is a "riveting" biography of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who was one of America's ablest military leaders asked to perform the near impossible in World War II--train and command a Chinese Army to fight against the Japanese.Tuchman`s purpose of using Stilwell's long connections with China which started in 1911 when he was a U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant, was to explore three historical strands.First, by using a plethora of sources, including Stilwell's diaries, she excelled in her purpose of providing an unusually candid biography of Stilwell's remarkable life.Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who personally observed Stilwell's first-rate military abilities as a trainer and leader of men, "...selected Stilwell for the post and felt responsible for having consigned him to an ill-supported mission and wasted the talents of an officer he respected as one of America's ablest field commanders" (391).However, early in Stillwell's career he came to be known by his moniker "Vinegar Joe," for his scowl whenever he thought someone or something went awry.His diary was full of pejoratives describing most British officers as "limeys," the French as "frogs," and when he soon lost all respect for Chiang he referred to him as "peanut."Though Tuchman throughout her biography displayed a great admiration for Stilwell, her caricature of Stilwell is as a man who did not possess the political skills necessary of a high-ranking officer to effectively lead a multi-national coalition in the China-India-Burma theatre of operations.

Tuchman's second purpose was to use Stilwell's four visits and postings in China as the backdrop to explain China's turbulent years--1911 through 1945.This part of her book lacked the depth necessary to provide the reader a good grounding in truly understanding the ever-shifting political situation in China.However, through this strand of her book, Tuchman was able to show how Stilwell had a "missionary's" love and concern for the plight of China's "teeming masses."Throughout his various observations of China's military in his capacity as America's military attaché from 1935 to 1937, Stilwell came to have, "...confidence in Chinese soldiers as fighting material and believed that if properly led they could become the equal of any army in the world" (172).

Third, Tuchman used Stilwell's life to explore America's foreign policy relationship with China, starting with America's Open Door Policy, but mainly focusing on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR's) desire that America could find in China a democratic partner to help block and eventually crush Japan's increasing influence in Asia.Unfortunately Tuchman, through no fault of her own because there is a scant written record on the subject, was unable to understand the crux of FDR's strategic purpose in first supporting Chiang with a naïve reverence, which ultimately undercut Stilwell's ability to get the Chinese Army to engage the Japanese in battle.However, once FDR witnessed Chiang's ineptitude at the Cairo Conference of 1943, he saw Chiang in the same light that Stilwell did.However, it was too late to provide Stilwell the political help he needed to use the Chinese army in a truly meaningful way to affect the wars outcome.Tuchman's book serves historians best as a biography of one of America's most able but tragically wasted generals of World War II.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.

The man who tried and failed to save China
This book's triumph begins with a brilliant idea: Barbara Tuchman's decision to combine a biography of Gen. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell with a history of China's failed republican revolution. To an amazing degree, Stilwell showed up as history was happening in China after the collapse of Qing Dynasty in 1911. During the Second World War, he played a leading - and doomed - role in United States' relationship with the incompetent, corrupt regime of Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, Stilwell is a perfect vehicle through which to explore the United States' tragic relationship with China for most of the last century. Stilwell is fascinating - tough, smart, curious about the world around him, disdainful of pretense, entirely lacking in tact and patience. In some ways, he was the perfect man to try to coax Chiang into actually fighting the Japanese who were devouring China in the `30s and `40s: Stilwell spoke fluent Chinese, knew Chinese culture, admired Chinese people, had faith in the beleaguered Chinese soldier's ability to fight - and was a brilliant battlefield tactician. In other ways, he was precisely the wrong man for the job: He lacked the temperament to hide the contempt he felt for the Generalissimo and the corrupt sycophants around him. As a result, Stilwell was ineffective in his dealings with Chiang. Then again, perhaps no one could have persuaded Chiang, who emerges here as equal parts stupid and arrogant (with an equally sickening wife), to defend his country instead of his own narrow interests. Tuchman strikes a nice balance between sweeping themes and intriguing, even funny details. True, I sometimes got lost in the narrative. I couldn't always remember the characters, and I got confused on military strategy - so much so that I couldn't evaluate the wisdom of Stilwell's plan for an aggressive ground offensive to retake Burma from the Japanese and weigh it against a rival plan from the British. At least one of its themes - the way a muzzled media presented a wildly misleading impression of Chiang's regime to the U.S. public - struck this reader as particularly timely.

Personality and History: The relationship between Chiang Kai
Who was Joseph Stilwell?What part did he play in the unfolding of China�s troubled century?It has been said that "men make a lot of history, and history makes a lot of men."To what extent was Stilwell "made" by the history he lived through?And how might the recent history of China have been different if another were in his position?How did the relationship between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi) affect their joint ability to save China from the Japanese?To what extent was the conflict between them made irrelevant by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Chiang Kai-Shek always said that the Japanese were a disease of the skin, but the Communists were a disease of the heart.Was he correct to hold back from fighting the Japanese so that he could spare his reserves for the inevitable conflict with the Communists?Might he have been more effective on both fronts if he had been more aggressive against the Japanese?And how would present day China be different if the Gomingdang rather than the Communist Party had been running China for past 50 years?What implications does this story have for the "Taiwan question?"

Nothing stands out more in my study of 20th Century China, than the frustration of so many situations where there were simply no good choices.Of course, I am not Chinese, so I suppose I am able, because of that, to view the period with some measure of detachment.But I was born in Tokyo, and grew up in the north of Japan, so, while I am always viewed as a foreigner in Asia, I am, in fact, a child of Asia, and keenly interested in what factors contributed to the painful history China has lived since the revolution of 1911.

One of the most interesting comparisons in this book is between Joseph Stilwell, and Claire Chennault.Barbara Tuchman clearly favors Stilwell, to the point where I would say that if this book were your only source of information about Chennault, and who he was, you probably would not have a very high opinion ofhim.But even Tuchman must admit that Claire Chennault had much better rapport with Chiang Kai-Shek than Stilwell.

Let me try to phrase the matter in very basic terms:Joseph Stilwell was a brilliant general who�s relational skills, and more importantly his relationship sense was seriously wanting.Throughout the book, I am struck, not by a deficiency of intelligence, or determination, or persistence, but by a lack of basic humanity. This deficiency hangs over Stilwell like a cloud, polluting his relationships with those with whom it was most important for him to get along.

For starters, he was one of the ungodliest officers in the history of the U.S. Army.To his daughter, he wrote about the "criminal instincts I picked up by being forced to go to Church and Sunday School, and seeing how little real good religion does anybody, I advise passing them all up and using common sense instead." This cynical godlessness expressed itself in many ways.Stilwell was generally contemptuous and disrespectful toward those with whom he disagreed (mostly Chiang Kai-Shek).This was a source of irritation to FDR, who felt that Chiang Kai-Shek was a head of state, and ought to be accorded the level of respect due one in that position.Stilwell did not see it that way.He constantly referred to Chiang in his diary as "Peanut," or "Hickory Head."Several times he referred to FDR himself as "Rubber Legs."The Japanese he called "buck-toothed bastards."

Both Churchill and MacArthur possessed a spiritual dimension that was completely foreign to Stilwell.Churchill used to say, "In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, goodwill.Stilwell probably should be given credit for understanding the first point, and perhaps the second in some measure.But for the rest of it, he was clueless.No, I mean really, completely clueless. When MacArthur ruled Japan as a virtual dictator after World War II, he issued a request for 10,000 missionaries.He also contacted the Gideons and requested as many bibles as they could supply.Whatever one may say about MacArthur�s personal spiritual life, he did understand that the essential problem of post-war Japan was a spiritual crisis.Stilwell had no such insight.Following a tour of the gutted and burned out districts of Yokohama after World War II, he said, "We gloated over the destruction and came in feeling fine."

At one point, after he had been removed from China, he allowed himself to believe that he would be chosen over MacArthurfor command of forces in the Pacific.By God�s mercy, he was not chosen, and the Japanese people experienced the big-heartedness of MacArthur.

This book is old.It came out in 1971.In spite of that, this is a very useful book.Barbara Tuchman was a war correspondent who personally witnessed much of the Sino-Japanese war during the 30s.She is very thorough, detailed and organized.She also possesses a level of objectivity which is refreshing in this day and age when so much written history is editorial in nature.

I have been pretty hard on Stilwell.Perhaps I have been so turned off by his acerbic nature that I have tended not to appreciate his brilliance as an officer.Marshall, who was always Stilwell�s strongest supporter, said that Stilwell was "his own worst enemy."The point, here, I guess, is that many good qualities can be obscured by a little bit of folly.Nonetheless, this, as I said, is a very useful book.It isn�t all about Stilwell.It is about a very important point in China�s history, and the way personality affected policy.Understanding the American experience in China is critical to comprehending how events developed toward the culmination of the conflict, in 1949.

great book !!
This is not just a book but a comprehensive education for anyone concerned with the love-hate relationship between American and China. Too bad it came out at such a late date.To me, both and Korean and Vietnam wars might have been avoided had it come out in the late 1940s or early 1950s ... Read more

Product Description
Two major influences have drawn the British people to the Holy Land over the centuries - the translation of the Bible into English and the imperial need to control the routes to India and, more recently, to the oil of the Middle East. These two magnets - the Bible and the sword - have drawn countless pilgrims, crusaders, missionaries, merchants and explorers to the land of the ancient Hebrews. Barbara Tuchman, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Zimmermann Telegram and The Guns of August, shows how these twin motivating forces of the Bible and the sword compelled the ancient crusaders and instilled themselves into the consciousness of the British people up to the present day. She writes stirringly and lucidly of Britain's conquest of the Turks at the end of World War I and the solemn moment of entering Jerusalem, an event that evoked the Balfour Declaration of 1917 establishing a British sponsored national home for the modern descendants of the Old Testament peoples. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (1)

Absolutely outstanding historical work
As with all Barbara Tuchman's other works, here again, she is an unbelievably gifted historian, not only in her understanding of the time periods which she covers, but in her ability to draw phenomenally vivid pictures of her subjects with her words. The personalities, places, events and times jump from the pages into your imagination and, whether you are reading or listening to her works, you land up being part of the history periods, intricately and enthusiastically caught up with all their pathos. This work covers the entire world, Europe, Colonial Africa and America, politically and sociologically, from 1865 to the First World War. The author's breadth and depth are astounding, and her descriptions, perceptions and understanding of the people, times and forces that drove world history during this period are magnificent, illustrated with a most masterful command of the English language. A true pleasure to enjoy. Highly recommended for amatuer and professional historians.
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Customer Reviews (2)

Well written but heavy on the western perspective
Tuchman is a historian par excellence with interesting tidbits and anecdotes that flavor an otherwise complicated review of U.S. Chinese relations from the 1920's to the tumultuous war years.Her depiction of Stillwell is too one-sided and flawed.The irascible general, although very conscientious and dedicated to bettering the Chinese Army also had a tendency of operating like a pro-Consul. Allied strategy also was more interested in protecting UK's and U.S. special interests and not so much in liberating mainland China from the Japanese vise. Why should Chinese troops go fight in Burma to relieve the Brits when the bulk of China was being enslaved and its inhabitants treated like lab rats? This strategic disconnect ultimately led to the vast misunderstanding between FDR and Chiang and to FDR's willingness to pull the plug on Chiang. I hope that a future book with balanced views from both Chinese and US/UK perspectives will settle the score in the interest of objectivity.

A great soldier handed an impossible task
This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs.Barbara W. Tuchman's book is a "riveting" biography of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who was one of America's ablest military leaders asked to perform the near impossible in World War II--train and command a Chinese Army to fight against the Japanese.Tuchman`s purpose of using Stilwell's long connections with China which started in 1911 when he was a U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant, was to explore three historical strands.First, by using a plethora of sources, including Stilwell's diaries, she excelled in her purpose of providing an unusually candid biography of Stilwell's remarkable life.Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who personally observed Stilwell's first-rate military abilities as a trainer and leader of men, "...selected Stilwell for the post and felt responsible for having consigned him to an ill-supported mission and wasted the talents of an officer he respected as one of America's ablest field commanders" (391).However, early in Stillwell's career he came to be known by his moniker "Vinegar Joe," for his scowl whenever he thought someone or something went awry.His diary was full of pejoratives describing most British officers as "limeys," the French as "frogs," and when he soon lost all respect for Chiang he referred to him as "peanut."Though Tuchman throughout her biography displayed a great admiration for Stilwell, her caricature of Stilwell is as a man who did not possess the political skills necessary of a high-ranking officer to effectively lead a multi-national coalition in the China-India-Burma theatre of operations.

Tuchman's second purpose was to use Stilwell's four visits and postings in China as the backdrop to explain China's turbulent years--1911 through 1945.This part of her book lacked the depth necessary to provide the reader a good grounding in truly understanding the ever-shifting political situation in China.However, through this strand of her book, Tuchman was able to show how Stilwell had a "missionary's" love and concern for the plight of China's "teeming masses."Throughout his various observations of China's military in his capacity as America's military attaché from 1935 to 1937, Stilwell came to have, "...confidence in Chinese soldiers as fighting material and believed that if properly led they could become the equal of any army in the world" (172).

Third, Tuchman used Stilwell's life to explore America's foreign policy relationship with China, starting with America's Open Door Policy, but mainly focusing on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR's) desire that America could find in China a democratic partner to help block and eventually crush Japan's increasing influence in Asia.Unfortunately Tuchman, through no fault of her own because there is a scant written record on the subject, was unable to understand the crux of FDR's strategic purpose in first supporting Chiang with a naïve reverence, which ultimately undercut Stilwell's ability to get the Chinese Army to engage the Japanese in battle.However, once FDR witnessed Chiang's ineptitude at the Cairo Conference of 1943, he saw Chiang in the same light that Stilwell did.However, it was too late to provide Stilwell the political help he needed to use the Chinese army in a truly meaningful way to affect the wars outcome.Tuchman's book serves historians best as a biography of one of America's most able but tragically wasted generals of World War II.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.
... Read more

Customer Reviews (2)

An anlysis of how we never learn from history
This work should be compulsory for politicians in times of change and turmoil, such as ours. The only problem I have with the book is the choice of Troy as an example. OK, I understand that it can be used as the archetypical model for a government which has left rationality behind and can only continue on its chosen path of self destruction, because otherwise it would have to admit that it is wrong.
Perhaps the book should have included at least one more example, like the Pelopponesian War (Athenian refusal to accept Spartan peace overtures) or the Mexican - American War of 1848 (the Mexican government refuses to arm civilians), to make its point even better. As it stands now the examples are very poignant but hardly support a comprehensive theory.Even so, the examples of the US war of independence and the Vietnam war eerily points towards the invasion of Iraq. The author died in 1989! Interpreting this book would indicate a trend in US foreign policy, inherited from the former British colonial masters.
A good companion volume to this would be Gordon Dixon: On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.

This is no Folly
Tuchman's "Folly" surveys four episodes in history - distinct in culture, chronlogy and geography but otherwise united in folly by the ruling leadership. Folly, as sess it, is policy pursued by leaders "contrary to self-interest". The problem for these leaders is that self-interest is often confused with selfishness - short-term benefits taking precedence over the longterm (or even when the benefits are illusory - with each episode displaying just outright stupidity).The Trojans greet Greeks bearing gifts; The renaissance Papacy provokes a protest; the British lose America and America loses Vietnam. In each of Tuchman's episodes, man's leadership not only trails his advances in science and the arts, but is actually inverse in relation - civilization takes a few thousand years to put a man on the moon, but hasn't yet developed a genuine government on Earth.

Works like "Folly" could easily fail based on prose (another boring history book!?) or if there are flaws in the overall analysis.But Tuchman excels on both counts.Not as in-depth as "Distant Mirror" (with its encyclopedic survey of the 13th century), "Folly" makes its point with razor-sharp clarity and Tuchman's prose are crisp and inviting. "Folly", for its thinness manages to find common ground in different eras and different forms of self-inflicted harm. Active, if ill-informed policy-making mires America in Vietnam, while the Trojans all but knock down their walls to make way for that gift-horse. On the flip side, British policy in the colonies seems clumsy, indicating that those for or against the colonies were incapable of formulating a cogent policy - the bane of a purely parliamentary system. Most lamentable (also the most entertaining), is the case of the renaissance popes. The Papacy raises an interesting issue, because the thesis requires the policy to issue from governments that choose the wrong course despite their capacity to go the right way - excluding "terminally corrupt regimes" like the Tsars and the KMT.Though the era of its folly (for purposes of the book) only spans the rule 6 popes over about 60 years (Sixtus IV - Clement VII), it's hard to fathom an analysis that allows for that leadership's capacity to lead.Among the myriad failings of each of the renaissance Popes was their habitual stacking of the College of Cardinals.Nepotism wasn't new before the reign of Sixtus, but in raising it to new heights held as an example by his successors, he set the Papacy into a cruel cycle.The stacked College chose successive popes who only were able to stack the College again.Being at once the product of the college of cardinals and also the architect of its new generation, the renaissance popes can do no more than prolong a corrupted system that bestowed upon them the papal tiara. Of the six popes cited, three actively pursue policy - while the remaining can do no more than continually tax christendom (especially the disunited German states), pursue confused alliances, arrange for lavish parties and deplete papal reserves. Under Tuchman's definition, self-harming policy is too inclusive of leadership incapable of forming policy. The corruption that bred the renaissance papacy was clearly endemic to the church of that era - with greed and manipulation of religion hardly limited to the seat of St. Peter - so it's hard to fault the popes. Tuchman clearly understands when recounting the reproach given to the future Leo X, that, were the Cardinals better men, they'd elect better popes, and "all men would be better for it". Unfortunately, as Tuchman notes, the Renaissance Cardinals could not be better men because they were chosen by the poor popes to begin with, while the Popes are stymied by the fact that they were chosen by an earlier generation of imperfect cardinals. How Rome broke this cycle, vindicating Tuchman by proving the papacy capable of doing so, gets too little shrift. In fact, the renaissance papacy, while corrupt, was also remarkably tolerant, and the reformation that it bred held dire consequences in terms of war and religious persecution of the Jews, every bit as painful as the machivellian schemeing of the pre-protestant papacy. It's all exasperating, heart-breaking and entertaining, but one wonders whether these episodes should have gotten their own book.In short, this tale of folly is a masterpiece. ... Read more

Customer Reviews (3)

Start here for world war one history
I've picked up quite a few books on the first and second world war, and this is definitely one of the must reads. It is a great read (no worries this is history written at its finest). The book's focus makes it a great read to get into this period. To get some more context I would also recommand Dreadnought by Robert K Massie. It focusses on the entire complex history of the coming of the great war. But in any case, start with the guns of August!!

A must read for the student of political-military history
Few of us have any real understanding of the events and personalities which pushed 1914 Europe into a war that should have been over in less than 6 weeks with a resultant German victory, but would instead grind on for years.In this her 3rd novel, Tuchman has done a monumental job of research and interpretation of the facts for the novice reader of military-political histories.She provides us a clear understanding of how the Kaiser and the Imperial German General Staff, contrived to build a case for war, developed a brilliant strategy to execute and win that war on two fronts [against the French and the Russians] and then to ultimately dominate the European continent.She introduces us to reluctant heroes like King Albert of Belgium and to weaker characters like Czar Nicholas of Russia.We are exposed to the brilliant German strategist Count Alfred Von Schlieffen who was the visionary for the incredibly bold and complex blueprint of military actions during the first 35-40 days of the Great War.Then she exposes flawed generals such as the indecisive Joffre of France and then the incompetent warriors like General Sir John French, of the British Expeditionary Forces.All in all... 'The Guns of August' [like Tuchman's 'Stillwell and the American Experience in China'] is a great read and a must have for the library of serious students of military-political history.One serious flaw however, is that this particular edition as produced by Tess Press, is overflowing with errors that even a novice proof-reader would have caught.They are so numerous as to be distracting and I would strongly recommend buying this great book only as published by a different printing house.

Very detailed.
This book is probably the best I have read this year.The author's presentation of the story behind the first world war is absolutely fantastic.I could not put it down and finished it in less than three days. ... Read more